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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Two of the issues Bear Hollow Restoration, LLC ("Bear Hollow") raised on 
appeal directly relate to the Individual Shareholders. 
1. Did the Public Service Commission ("Commission") err in ruling that it did 
not have jurisdiction over the Individual Shareholders wh^n Bear Hollow (a) did not 
allege that the Individual Shareholders own or control a "water system" as defined by 
Utah Code section 54-2-l(30)(a), but instead alleged only that the Individual 
Shareholders collectively own the majority of the shares iri Summit Water and control 
that entity; and (b) did not allege that the Individual Shareholder serve the public 
generally? 
Standard of Review: "The question of Commission jurisdiction turns on statutory 
interpretation and therefore presents a question of law that we review for correctness." 
In order to avoid unnecessary duplication, this brief focusds on the facts and arguments 
that relate directly to the Individual Shareholders. Although Summit Water Distrituion 
Company ("Summit Water") joins in the arguments presented herein, it is filing a 
separate appellate brief that addresses the facts and arguments that more distinctly relate 
to that entity. See generally Utah R. App. P. 24(i) ("In cases involving more than one 
appellant or appellee . . . any number of either may joih in a single brief, and any 
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another."). 
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Heber Light & Power Co. v. Utah Public Service Comm'n., 2010 UT 27, ^ 6, 231 P.3d 
1203. However, "to ensure that the administrative powers of the [Commission] are not 
overextended, any reasonable doubt of the existence of any power must be resolved 
against the exercise thereof." Id. at f 17 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
2. Did the Commission err when it denied Bear Hollow's effort to amend its 
complaint pursuant to Administrative Rule 746-100-3.D after the Commission already 
had dismissed the entire case for lack of jurisdiction? 
Standard of Review: "[T]he Utah Supreme Court has held that appellate 
courts should employ an intermediate standard, one of some, but not total, deference, in 
reviewing an agency's application of its own rules. Thus, we review the Commission's 
application of its own rules for reasonableness and rationality." Resort Retainers v. 
Labor Comm'n., 2010 UT App 229, TJ 3, P.3d (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted); see also Union Pacific R. Co. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 842 P.2d 876, 878 (Utah 1992) ("Because courts should uphold agency rules if 
they are reasonable and rational, courts should also uphold reasonable and rational 
departures from those rules . . . . We thus employ an intermediate standard (one of some, 
but not total, deference) in reviewing Union Pacific's claim that the Commission erred in 
applying its rules."). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE^ 
Complete copies of the determinative statutes are included as Attachment ("Att.") 
A hereto. The pertinent potions of the statutes are as follows 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 (West 2004): 
"The commission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and 
regulate every public utility in this state and to supervise all pf the business of every such 
public utility . . . ." 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-l(16)(a) (West Supp. 2010): 
"'Public utility' includes every . . . water corporation . . . where the service is 
performed for, or the commodity delivered to, the public generally . . . . " 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(29) (West Supp. 2010): 
'"Water corporation' includes every corporation and person . . . owning, 
controlling, operating, or managing any water system for public service within this state." 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-l(30)(a) (West Supp. 2010): 
"'Water system' includes all reservoirs, tunnels, shafts, dams, dikes, headgates, 
pipes, flumes, canals, structures, and appliances . . . owned, controlled, operated, or 
managed in connection with or to facilitate the diversion, development, storage, supply, 
distribution, sale, furnishing, carriage, appointment, apportionment, or measurement of 
water . . . . " 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15 (West Supp. 2010): 
"(1) Before seeking judicial review of the commission's action, any party . . . who 
is dissatisfied with an order of the commission shall meet the requirements of this 
section. 
"(2)(a) After an order or decision has been made by the commission, any party to 
the action . . . may apply for rehearing of any matters determined in the action or 
proceeding. 
"(b) An applicant may not urge or rely on any ground not set forth in the 
application in an appeal to any court... ." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Course of Proceedings 
This appeal arises from the Commission's dismissal of Bear Hollow's complaint 
against the Individual Shareholders and Summit Water. With respect to the Individual 
3 
Shareholders, the Commission dismissed that complaint after recognizing that "there is 
no factual allegation that any of the [Individual Shareholders], individually or 
collectively, is a water company serving the public or that any - individually or 
collectively, is a water system serving the public." [R. 023 at p.6 (Order of Dismissal), 
included as Att. B (emphasis omitted)]. Rather, Bear Hollow uallege[d] only that the 
shareholders have shares in Summit [Water], which in turn is allegedly a 'public 
utility[,]' 'water corporation,' or 'water system[.]'" [Id. (emphasis omitted)]. 
After the Commission dismissed Bear Hollow's complaint for lack of jurisdiction, 
Bear Hollow filed a Request for Rehearing, along with a proposed First Amended 
Complaint. [See R. 024; R. 029]. The Commission denied Bear Hollow's request for 
rehearing. The Commission further rejected the First Amended Complaint based upon 
this Court's prior declaration that "'an order of dismissal is a final adjudication, and 
thereafter a plaintiff may not file an amended complaint.'" [R. 027 (Order Denying 
Rehearing), included as Att. C (quoting Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 231, 232 (Utah 
1976))]. 
Bear Hollow appeals the Commission's determinations. 
2. Statement of Facts 
Summit Water is a non-profit company that provides water to its shareholders. 
[See R. 001 (Complaint) at % 2, included as Att. D; see also R. 023 (Att. B) at p. 12]. 
Because of its nature, "[t]he Division [of Public Utilities] feels that regulation of [Summit 
Water] would be superfluous and [repeatedly has] recommend[ed] that the Commission 
take no action . . . regarding [Summit Water]." [R. 006, Exhibit A (Division of Public 
Utilities Statement)]. In fact, as a company, Summit Water has been analyzed three times 
by the Division of Public Utilities. Each time, the Division has determined that Summit 
Water should not be subject to regulation by the Commission. [See id. (Exs. A, B & C)]. 
The Individual Shareholders allegedly are "'Class A' shareholders] of 
Respondent Summit Water." [See R. 001 (Att. D) at ffi[ U 3-15]. The Individual 
Shareholders, as alleged "upon information and belief/ are a mixture of distinct 
individuals, Utah limited partnerships, trusts, and a "Georgia 'for profit' corporation." 
[id.]. 
Bear Hollow, like the Individual Shareholders, also is a "'Class A' shareholder of 
Respondent Summit Water." [See id. at \ 1]. Bear Hollow acquired its shares when they 
were sold as part of the bankruptcy proceedings of a third party that had acquired them in 
anticipation of developing certain real property. Both before and after Bear Hollow's 
acquisition of these Class A shares, the shares were required to be appurtenant to the 
development project and inseparable from the development property. [See id. at \ 109; 
R. 005 at p. 2-3]. In this respect, the Class A shares Bear Hollow obtained were treated 
no differently than the Class A shares owned by most of the Individual Shareholders. [R. 
005 at p. 2-3.].2 
Most of the Individual Shareholders named in this action also are developers or 
development projects. [R. 016 at p. 6 n.7]. For example, Parley's Lane, Ltd. is 
developing 75 acres of land near Parley's Summit, and its shares in Summit Water are 
specific to that property. [Id.]. Landmark Plaza Associates was a limited partnership that 
developed land near Kimball Junction. That property was fully developed, and any 
shares in Summit Water owned by that entity were conveyed to the individual property 
owners (e.g., Hampton Inn) years ago. [Id. at p. 6]. 
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In May 2009, Bear Hollow sought to obtain special treatment from Summit Water 
to strip its Class A shares from the development property and sell them to a third-party. 
[R. 005 at p. 3; see also R. 001 (Att. D) at ffi[ 109-18]. When its request was refused, 
Bear Hollow initiated the current action before the Commission, naming both Summit 
Water and its Individual Shareholders. [R. 005; see generally R. 001]. 
Bear Hollow's complaint essentially made four allegations with respect to the 
Individual Shareholders. First, Bear Hollow alleged that, like itself, each of the 
Individual Shareholders "is a Class A shareholder of [Summit Water]." [R. 001 (Att. D) 
at Tflf 1, 3-15]. Second, Bear Hollow alleged that Class A shares represent "no interest 
whatsoever in [Summit Water]'s water distribution works, e.g., water diversion facilities, 
pipelines, water storage facilities, appurtenant works, etc." [Id. at f 77]. Third, it alleged 
that between 1995 and 2002, some of the Individual Shareholders sold Class A shares to 
unrelated third-parties. [Id. at ffl[ 28-38]. Fourth, it alleged that the Individual 
Shareholders' Class A shares, collectively, account for "52% of [Summit Waterj's total 
issued and outstanding shares." [Id. at J^ 87]. Based on these allegations, Bear Hollow 
"requested] an order from the Commission finding that the [Individual] Respondents . . . 
are public utilities subject to Commission regulation." [Id. at % 135], 
The Individual Shareholders moved to dismiss Bear Hollow's complaint on the 
grounds that: (1) The Complaint did not allege that the Individual Shareholders each 
owned or controlled a "public utility" or "water system" as defined by Utah Code, but 
instead merely alleged that the Individual Shareholders owned stock in Summit Water; 
and (2) Even if ownership of a company's stock was sufficient to establish that the 
Individual Shareholders each owned or controlled a "water system" as defined by Utah 
Code, Bear Hollow had not alleged that the Individual Shareholders were serving the 
public generally. [See R. 005; see also R. 016]. 
Bear Hollow's Memorandum in Opposition argued that the Commission had 
jurisdiction to regulate the Individual Shareholders as "pubUc utilities" based solely on 
their alleged collective status as the majority sharehblders of Summit Water. 
Specifically, Bear Hollow argued as follows: "[T]he [Individual Shareholders] are in 
actuality operating the Company [(Summit Water)] and exercising manipulation and 
control of the Company behind the scenes in a manner that allows them to exploit the 
Company's limited resources for their personal gain. Consequently, . . . Bear Hollow 
petitions the Commission to exercise its jurisdiction over th£ [Individual Shareholders]." 
[R. Oil at p. iii]. Bear Hollow further described its own complaint in the following 
manner: "[T]he Complaint clearly establishes that the [Individual Shareholders] are 
named as parties in the proceeding based on their control o^ [Summit Water]." [Id at p. 
3].3 
Thus, the issue squarely presented to the Commission (and to this Court) was 
whether the alleged, collective ownership of a majority interest in a company that is 
alleged to own or control a ''water system" under Utah codq is sufficient to establish that 
See also R. Oil. at p. 2 ("[T]he [Individual Shareholders] are . . . subject to the 
Commission's jurisdiction based on their operation and control of [Summit Water]."); id 
at 6 ("[T]he [Individual Shareholders'] control and management of [Summit Water] . . . 
subjects the [Individual Shareholders] to the Commission's Jurisdiction."). 
7 
the shareholders themselves qualify as a "public utility" subject to the Commission's 
jurisdiction. 
The Commission reviewed Bear Hollow's Complaint and the filings related to the 
Individual Shareholder's motion to dismiss, and rejected Bear Hollow's contention that 
owning and controlling stock in a corporation is the same thing as owning and controlling 
the "reservoirs, tunnels, shafts, dams, dikes, [etc.]," allegedly owned by that company. 
[See R. 023 (Att. B) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-l(30)(a) (defining "water 
system"))]. The Court recognized that "[w]hile the [Individual] [Shareholders might 
have an interest in Summit as a corporation, that does not, by itself, give them an interest 
or control over specific assets" owned by that corporation. [Id. at p. 7]. Rather, "'a 
corporation is regarded as a separate and distinct legal entity from its stockholders.'" [Id. 
at p. 6 (quoting DeGrazio v. Legal Title Co., 2006 UT App. 183, at *1)].4 Because there 
was no allegation or evidence that each of the Individual Shareholders owned their own 
"water system" or otherwise qualified as a "public utility," the Commission dismissed the 
claims against the Individual Shareholders. 
Bear Hollow subsequently filed a Request for Rehearing with the Commission. 
[See R. 024], As part of that filing, "Bear Hollow requested] that the Commission . . . 
4
 Although the Commission noted that this distinction can be erased if an alter-ego theory 
is proven, the Commission correctly recognized that such a theory was equitable in nature 
and therefore outside of its jurisdiction, which is to regulate public utilities. [See R. 023 
(Att. B) at p. 8-9], The Commission further recognized that if it were to start 
adjudicating issues that related to a shareholder's or director's exercise of his "control" 
over a corporation it would "lead the Commission to intercede in issues involving 
corporate governance, shareholder disputes, contractual disputes, business torts, etc." [Id. 
at p. 9]. 
allow consideration of Bear Hollow's First Amended Complaint/' which was filed 
concurrently with the Request for Rehearing. [See R. 029]. The Individual Shareholders 
opposed both the request for rehearing and the filing of an amended complaint. [See R. 
026]. 
The Commission, after considering the briefing of all of the parties, "decline[d] to 
grant a rehearing on the order granting the Motions to Dismiss." [R. 027 (Att. C)]. The 
Commission further "decline[d] to consider the amended complaint," stating that "'an 
order of dismissal is a final adjudication, and thereafter a plaintiff may not file an 
amended complaint.'" [Id (quoting Nichols, 554 P.2d at 232)]. This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In order to minimize redundancy and in accordance with Rule 24(i) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Individual Shareholders and Summit Water have 
agreed that this brief will focus on the issue of whether collectively owning a majority of 
the shares of a corporation—even one that is a public utility—is sufficient to establish 
that the shareholders themselves qualify as a public utility under Utah law. These parties 
further agreed that this brief will address the procedural question of the whether Bear 
Hollow was allowed to file an amended complaint as of right after the entire case had 
been dismissed by the Commission for lack of jurisdiction. Summit Water addresses the 
remaining issues raised by Bear Hollow. The Individual Shareholders join in the 
arguments presented by Summit Water, and will not repeat those arguments here. 
Bear Hollow's argument with respect to the Commission's jurisdiction over the 
Individual Shareholders seeks to extend the Commission's jurisdiction far beyond the 
9 
limits provided by the legislature. The Commission has limited authority to regulate the 
affairs of "public utilities." With respect to water companies, that authority translates to 
the jurisdiction to regulate individuals or companies who directly own or control 
"reservoirs, tunnels, shafts, dams," etc. when they are used for the distribution of water to 
the public generally. In this case, Bear Hollow has not alleged that the Individual 
Shareholders either own or control "reservoirs, tunnels, shafts, dams," etc. or that they did 
so in order to distribute water to the public generally. Rather, Bear Hollow's "Complaint 
clearly establishes that the [Individual Shareholders] are named as parties in the 
proceeding based on their control of [Summit Water]." [R. Oil at p. 3 (Bear Hollow's 
Mem. in Opp.)]. Even assuming Bear Hollow's allegations are accurate, they are legally 
insufficient. Owning shares in and/or controlling a company is not the same thing as 
owning or controlling a water system for public use. 
Bear Hollow's argument that it should have been allowed to amend its complaint 
as a matter of right after the entire case had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction 
ignores not only the decisions from this Court and the Utah Court of Appeals, but what is 
a uniform and nationally accepted standard. Courts repeatedly and consistently have 
ruled that once a motion to dismiss has been granted, the Plaintiff can no longer amend 
his complaint as a matter of right. As such, the Commission did not act unreasonably or 
irrationally when it applied its own regulations in accordance with these rulings. 
For these reasons, the Commission's rulings should be affirmed in their entirety. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMISSION PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT IT LACKED 
JURISDICTION OVER THE INDIVIDUAL SHAREHOLDERS BECAUSE 
THEY ARE NOT "PUBLIC UTILITIES" UNDER UTAH LAW. 
Despite Bear Hollow's many arguments on appeal (most of which were not before 
the Commission), the scope of the second issue before the Court is both narrow and 
certain. As Bear Hollow itself declared, its "Complaint clearly establishes that the 
[Individual Shareholders] [we]re named as parties in the proceeding based on their 
[alleged] control of [Summit Water]." [R. Oil at p. 3 (B^ar Hollow's Opposition to 
Motion to Dismiss)].3 Thus, the issue this Court must decide is whether control of a 
company—even a company that is alleged to be a public utility—is sufficient to establish 
that the shareholders and/or officers of that company each individually constitute a 
I 
"public utility" as that term is defined by Utah Code. A review of the statutory 
provisions governing the Commission's jurisdiction answers this question firmly against 
Bear Hollow's position. 
As a purely legal principle, Bear Hollow is incorrect when it alleges that the Individual 
Shareholders "control" Summit Water. Summit Water is its own entity, distinct from the 
Individual Shareholders. See generally 18 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 2 (2009) ("A 
corporation is a legal entity with an identity or personality separate and distinct from that 
of its owners or shareholders and must be thought of without reference to the members 
who compose it."); Dockstader v. Walker, 510 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1973) ("Ordinarily a 
corporation is regarded as a legal entity, separate and apart from its stockholders."). 
While Summit Water must act through its authorized agents, its agents are bound by strict 
legal duties that require them to act solely in the company's (as opposed to their own) 
personal interests. See, e.g., 18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1480 ("As part of their 
fiduciary role, directors and officers must remain loyal to the corporation . . . whose 
interest must take precedence over any self-interest . . . . The duty of loyalty extends to 
nonprofit corporations as well as to ordinary business corporations."). 
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A. Bear Hollow's Allegation that the Individual Shareholders Own in 
Shares in and "Control" Summit Water is Insufficient to Establish that 
the Individual Shareholders Themselves are a "Public Utility." 
"It is well established that the Commission has no inherent regulatory powers 
other than those expressly granted or clearly implied by statute." Heber Light & Power 
Co., 2010 UT 27, T| 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). "When a specific power is 
conferred by a statute upon a . . . commission with limited powers, the powers are limited 
to such as are specifically mentioned." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration 
in original). "Accordingly to ensure that the administrative powers of the [Commission] 
are not overextended, any reasonable doubt of the existence of any power must be 
resolved against the exercise thereof." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration 
in original). 
In this case, the Commission's jurisdictional reach is undisputedly narrow. "The 
[C]omission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every 
public utility . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1. "Public utility" is defined to include 
"'water corporation^] . . . where the service is performed for, or the commodity delivered 
to, the public generally.'" Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-l(16)(a). Water corporations are defined 
as "every corporation and person . . . owning [or] controlling . . . any water system for 
public service." Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(29). And, a "water system" is defined as the 
"reservoirs, tunnels, shafts, dams, dikes, pipes," etc. when used for the distribution or sale of 
water. Id. § 54-2-l(30)(a). In short, the Commission has jurisdiction to regulate individuals 
or companies who directly own or control "reservoirs, tunnels, shafts, dams," etc. when they 
are used for the distribution of water to the public generally. 
Nowhere in the Utah Code does owning or controlling afi entity subject an individual 
to the Commission's jurisdiction "to supervise and regulate every public utility." Id. § 54-4-
1. "The PSC has no inherent regulatory powers [beyohd the applicable statutory 
provisions]." Heber Power & Light Co., 2010 UT 27, f 17. As such, the Commission's 
dismissal of the Individual Shareholders must be affirmed. T|iere simply is not a statutory 
basis for extending the Commission's jurisdiction to shareholders of an entity. Owning or 
controlling a corporation is not the same thing as owning or controlling "reservoirs, tunnels, 
shafts, dams, dikes," etc. and using these same properties to serve "the public generally." 
Even looking beyond the Utah Code, Bear Hollow has not provided a single 
citation to the Administrative Rules, the Commission's own decisions, or the rulings from 
this Court, the Utah Court of Appeals, or any of the other states that have created similar 
public service commissions, where an individual was subject to the Commission's 
jurisdiction simply because they owned or controlled a distinct legal entity, even if that 
entity itself was a public utility. In fact, Bear Hollow only provided one example of 
where the Commission exercised jurisdiction over a water system, which was an order 
from the Commission in the Boulder King Ranch Estates Water Company matter.6 [See 
6
 Bear Hollow cites a total of 13 other cases in its appellate brief. Of those cases, 10 do 
not address the Commission's jurisdiction at all. Th^ remaining 3 did address 
jurisdiction, but do not help Bear Hollow's arguments on appeal. See WWC Holding Co., 
Inc. v. Public Serv. Comrn'n, 2002 UT 23, f^ 6, 44 P.3d 7114 (affirming Commission's 
finding that requested action was not in the public interest); Williams v. Public Service 
Comm 'rc, 720 P.2d 773, 775-77 (Utah 1986) (addressing provisions of Utah Code dealing 
with administrative rule making); Garkane Power Co. v. public Service Cornm'n., 100 
P.2d 571, 572 (Utah 1940) (determining Commission ladked jurisdiction because the 
company in question did not make its services "open to the! indefinite public" but rather 
served only its members). 
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App. Brief, Att. H]. Notably, that case demonstrates the opposite of Bear Hollow's 
current position. In Boulder King, the Commission found that one individual "ha[d] 
maintained [sole] control over [the water company], to the detriment of customers, and 
possibly the [c]ompany itself and that the "[cjompany was subject to the regulatory 
jurisdiction of this Commission." [Id. at 4]. Despite these explicit findings, the 
Commission did not assert jurisdiction over the individual who actually controlled the 
entity at issue. [See id. at 6]. Cf. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Public 
Service Comm'n of West Virginia, 527 S.E.2d 495, 496-501 (W.V. 1998) (refusing to 
extend commission's jurisdiction to parent company of regulated utility). 
Moreover, exercising jurisdiction over the shareholders (and even the officers 
and/or directors) of a public utility does not further the purposes for which the 
Commission was created. This Court declared the "purposes for which the Legislature 
created the [Commission], namely regulation of utility rates." Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. 
Public Service Comm 'n. of Utah, 682 P.2d 858, 860 (Utah 1984).8 Once the Commission 
exercises control over the entity itself (assuming it is a "public utility"), it can perform 
this purpose without having to extend its jurisdictional reach to the individual 
Bear Hollow also spends several pages discussing Utah Admin R746-331-1, which has 
been repealed by the Commission. Before its repeal, that rule provided that the 
Commission umay undertake an inquiry to determine whether an entity organized as a 
mutual, non-profit corporation . . . is outside the Commission's jurisdiction." Id. 
(emphasis added). Nothing in that rule supports exercising jurisdiction over the 
individual shareholders of that entity. 
8
 See also R. 028 at p. 19 (Bear Hollow's Counsel: "And the commission - why do we 
have a commission? The commission exists to regulate monopoly utilities like Questar 
and Rocky Mountain Power.") 
shareholders of that entity. For example, PacifiCorp is a subsidiary of Berkshire 
Hathaway, but that doesn't mean the Commission needs to exercise jurisdiction over 
Warren Buffet (Berkshire Hathaway's CEO and largest shareholder) in order to regulate 
PacifiCorp's utility rates. 
In short, the Commission's purpose is clear and its jurisdiction is both limited and 
unambiguous. The Commission has jurisdiction "to supervise and regulate" public 
utilities, id § 54-4-1, which are defined to include "every corporation and person . . . 
owning [or] controlling," id § 54-2-1(29), "reservoirs, tunnels, shafts, dams, dikes," etc. 
for public service within this state, id § 54-2-l(30)(a). Bear Hollow admittedly has not 
alleged that the Individual Shareholders independently own or control "reservoirs, 
tunnels, shafts, dams," etc. Instead, as Bear Hollow openly declared to the Commission, 
"the [Individual Shareholders] are named as parties in thq proceeding based on their 
[alleged ownership and] control of [Summit Water]." [R. Oil at p. 3]. Nothing in the 
Utah Code or anywhere else supports Bear Hollow's novel assertion that owning shares 
in a company-even the majority of shares in a company-ip the same thing as being a 
public utility. As such, the Commission properly dismissed the Individual Shareholders. 
1. Bear Hollow's Many Arguments To The Contrary Cannot Change 
The Scope Of The Commission's Jurisdiction. 
With the relevant statutory framework of the Commission's jurisdiction addressed, 
the Individual Shareholders now address Bear Hollow's couiiter arguments. 
First, Bear Hollow cites to Utah Code section 54-7-26. That section provides that 
"[e]very officer, agent, or employee of any public utility who violates . . . this title, or. . . 
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any order . . . of the [Cjomission . . . is guilty of a class A misdemeanor." Utah Code 
Ann. § 54-7-26. That section, however, does not establish (or even suggest) that every 
"officer, agent, or employee of any public utility" is himself a "public utility," which is 
what Bear Hollow seemingly argues. In any event, that statute is inapplicable. The 
Commission determined that, based on Bear Hollow's allegations and consistent with the 
Division of Public Utilities prior evaluations, Summit Water is not a "public utility." 
Thus, the Individual Shareholders were not "officer[s], agentfs], or employee[s] of any 
public utility." Id. 
Moreover, Bear Hollow did not present this argument to the Commission as part 
of its application for rehearing. [See R. 024]. As such, it has waived this argument. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(b) ("An applicant [for reconsideration] may not urge or 
rely on any ground not set forth in the application in an appeal to any court."); accord In 
re Questar Gas Co., 2007 UT 79, f 42, 175 P.3d 545; Desert Power, LP v. Public Service 
Comm'n., 2007 UT App 374, % 17, 173 P.3d 218; see also Williams v. Public Service 
Cornm'n., 754 P.2d 41, 46 (Utah 1988) ("[S]ection 54-7-15 states that petitioning parties 
can only bring those grounds before this Court that were argued in the application for 
rehearing."). 
Second, Bear Hollow cites to Utah Code section 54-7-28. That section provides 
that "[e]very person who, either individually, or acting as an officer, agent, or employee 
of a corporation other than a public utility, violates any provision of this title or fails to 
observe . . . any order . . . of the commission . . . . is guilty of a class A misdemeanor." 
Utah Code § 54-7-28. Again, this section is not designed to provide the Commission 
with sweeping authority to regulate the affairs of "every person" including "employee[s] 
of a corporation other than a public utility." Indeed, such an interpretation would wholly 
ignore the limited jurisdictional reach declared by the legislature. See Utah Code § 54-4-
1 (limiting jurisdiction to the regulation of "public utilities").9 Furthermore, Bear 
Hollow's Complaint was not premised on this provision. In4eed, the relief Bear Hollow 
requested was not a criminal prosecution pursuant to section 54-7-28 (which it would 
have no authority to initiate), but rather "an order from the Commission finding that the 
[Individual] Respondents . . . are public utilities subject to Commission regulation," 
pursuant to Utah Code section 54-4-1. [R. 001 (Att. D) at f 135; see also R. 028 at p. 58-
59 ("Bear Hollow respectfully requests that the commission commence a commission 
inquiry as to whether all of the [Individual] respondents . . . should be regulated as a 
public utility . . . .")]. Moreover, this argument was not presented in Bear Hollow's 
application for rehearing and therefore, as noted, has been waived on appeal. See Utah 
Code Ann. §54-7-15(2)(b). 
Third, Bear Hollow references an antirust complaint throughout its brief. The 
antitrust complaint is not properly part of the record on appeal. Again, Bear Hollow did 
not properly present that complaint to the Commission. The antitrust complaint was not 
9
 Of course, there are instances where the Commission has limited authority over 
individuals and/or entities that do not meet the statutory definition of "public utility." For 
example, section 54-7-3 provides that the Commission may "issue subpoenas for the 
attendance of witnesses and the production of papers," and section 54-7-28 would allow 
the Commission to punish individuals who fail to comply. 
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attached to, nor was it even referenced in, Bear Hollow's Complaint. Moreover, the 
antitrust complaint was not referenced or attached to Bear Hollow's request for rehearing. 
As such, Bear Hollow's arguments with respect to the antitrust complaint have been 
waived. See Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(b).u 
Fourth, Bear Hollow argues that Summit Water's Class A shareholders actually 
have an ownership interest in the assets Summit Water owns. That argument is found 
nowhere in the Complaint. In fact, Bear Hollow's Complaint declared that "Class A 
(development) shares represent no interest whatsoever in the corporation's water 
distribution works, e.g., water diversion facilities, pipelines, water storage facilities, 
appurtenant works, etc." [R. 001 (Att. D) at ^ 77]. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-l(30)(a) 
(defining '"water system" as "reservoirs, tunnels, shafts, dams, dikes, pipes," etc when used 
Notably, during the hearing on the motions to dismiss Bear Hollow's complaint, Bear 
Hollow repeatedly emphasized that when reaching its decision, the Commission was 
limited to facts included as part of Bear Hollow's Complaint. See, e.g., R. 028 at p. 21 
(Bear Hollow: "We have to look at the complaint and the things that are in the 
complaint."); id. at 20 ("Today all we need to think about and all we need to look at today 
is the complaint and the allegations made there. Now, that's been recognized I think by 
everybody; there's no question about that."); id ("We're happy to stand on what is 
alleged in our complaint . . . ."); id at 54 ("We're not here for a trial, we're not here for 
an evidentiary hearing, we're here on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction . . . . 
And I would urge Judge Arredondo and the [Cjommission to carefully review the 
allegations of the complaint.")]. 
11
 In any event, the antitrust complaint is taken out of context. That complaint was filed 
more than four years ago as part of a distinct and unrelated case that has been pending for 
the better part of a decade and has been significantly revised, refined, and limited, 
including by the decision of this Court. See generally Summit Water Distrib. Co. v. 
Summit County, 2005 UT 73, 123 P.3d 437. Indeed, the district court's docket, as 
accessed through the Utah State Court's XChange system, alone is 53 pages long. Thus, 
Bear Hollow's selection of a few paragraphs from one of the tens of thousands of pages 
of filings in that case is both outside the scope of the issues before this Court and 
incomplete in any event. 
to serve the public generally). Furthermore, this argument was not contained in Bear 
Hollow's application for a rehearing and, therefore, has been waived. See id. at § 54-7-
15(2)(b).12 
Fifth, Bear Hollow's Complaint and appellate brief make a number of assertions 
that have nothing to do with the regulation of public utilities $r utility rates. For example, 
Bear Hollow alleges that "the [Individual] Respondents : . . have manipulated and 
dominated the operations of SWDC to exploit SWDC's limited resources for their 
personal gains." [App. Brief p. 38; accord id. at p. 42]. 4fBear Hollow [likewise] has 
alleged that [two of the Individual Shareholders] have caused SWDC to issue them 
additional Class A shares to ensure their continued control over the company . . . ." [Id. 
at p. 44]. 
As the Commission properly recognized, by presenting such claims, Bear Hollow 
has stepped far outside of the Commission's intended purpose and has asked "the 
Commission to intercede in issues involving corporate governance, shareholder disputes, 
contractual disputes, business torts, etc. Issues such as thes^ (although they may [or may 
not] have merit) which do not involve the provision of service affecting consumer 
12
 Even if the Court were to consider this argument, it should still be rejected because it 
ignores the fundamental difference between shareholders of a company and the company 
itself Additionally, Bear Hollow has not recognized that if this Court were to rule that 
owning Class A shares of an entity is the same as having) an ownership interest in the 
company's assets (i.e., it translates to an ownership interest in the company's "reservoirs, 
tunnels, shafts, dams," etc.), Bear Hollow-a Class A shareholder of Summit Water-
would likewise be subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. In fact, every shareholder 
would have to be deemed a "public utility" if Bear Hollow's argument were accepted, 
and the Commission's jurisdiction would be vastly expanded beyond its current limits in 
contravention of the plain language of the Utah code and the declared purposes of the 
Commission. 
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interests, or other areas typically under Commission jurisdiction, are not within the 
Commission's jurisdiction to remedy." [R. 023 (At. B) at p. 9]. The Commission was 
designed for the purpose of the "regulation of utility rates," see Keams-Tribune Corp., 
682 P.2d at 860, not for the adjudication of commercial litigation. As such, these 
allegations do not support Commission jurisdiction. 
In short, Bear Hollow's many arguments cannot change what it alleged and argued 
to the Commission, nor what the Legislature actually enacted. Bear Hollow has never 
contended or presented evidence that the Individual Shareholders each own or control 
"reservoirs, tunnels, shafts, dams," etc. that are used for the distribution of water to the 
"public generally." As such, there is no basis for finding that the Individual Shareholders 
are a "public utility" under Utah law, and the Commission's order dismissing the Individual 
Shareholders should be affirmed. 
B. Even if the Individual Shareholders Each Owned or Controlled a 
Water System, Bear Hollow Has not Alleged That the Individual 
Shareholders Serve the Public Generally. 
Even if this Court determined that the Individual Shareholder's alleged control of 
Summit Water established that each of the Individual Shareholders owned or controlled a 
water system, the Individual Shareholder still would have to be dismissed from this case 
because there is no allegation that the Individual Shareholders serve the public generally. 
See generally Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-l(16)(a) ("'Public Utility' includes . . . [a] water 
corporation . . . where the service is performed for, or the commodity delivered to, the 
public generally . . . ." (emphasis added)); id.§ 54-2-1(29) (limiting the definition of 
"water corporation" to those who own or operate "water systems for public service within 
the state" (emphasis added)); State v. Nelson, 238 P. 237, 239 (Utah 1925) ("[I]f the 
business or concern is not public service . . . it is not subject to the jurisdiction or 
regulation of the commission."). 
Bear Hollow has not identified a single person that receives water from the 
Individual Shareholders (as opposed to Summit Water) or alleged that such service has 
occurred. At most, Bear Hollow alleged that a few individuals negotiated with the 
Individual Shareholders for the purchase of stock. [See generally R. 001 (Att. D) ^ 28-
38]. These limited transactions, even if accepted, do not constitute serving "the public 
generally" or "public service." As such, the Commission's order dismissing the 
Individual Shareholders should be affirmed for this independent reason.13 
C. The Individual Shareholders Join in Summit Water's Arguments 
About Serving the Public Generally. 
The Commission's order also dismissed Bear Hollow's complaint on the grounds 
that Summit Water does not provide water to the public geneially and thus Summit Water 
is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. The legal standards and arguments 
addressing this issue are fully briefed by Summit Water, and the Individual Shareholders 
hereby incorporate those arguments by reference as part of this brief. See generally Utah 
R. App. P. 24(i). Simply put, if Summit Water does not serve the public generally, than 
Although the Individual Shareholder presented this argument to the Commission, the 
Commission did not explicitly dismiss the Individual Respondents on this basis. 
Nevertheless, this Court may affirm for any reason. See, e.g., DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 
428, 444 (Utah 1995) ("It is well-settled that an appellate court may affirm a trial court's 
ruling on any proper grounds, even though the trial court relied on some other ground."). 
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the Individual Shareholders of Summit Water cannot be found to serve the public 
generally by virtue of their ownership interest in Summit Water. 
II. THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW 
BEAR HOLLOW TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT AFTER THE ENTIRE 
CASE HAD BEEN DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 
Bear Hollow argues that even though its proposed amended complaint was not 
before the Commission when it dismissed this case for lack of jurisdiction, the 
Commission nevertheless should have considered Bear Hollow's new complaint when 
deciding Bear Hollow's request for a rehearing of the Commission's original order. Bear 
Hollow provides no authority for this position other than Administrative Rule 746-100-
3.D. Indeed, Bear Hollow has not cited a single instance where a party was allowed to 
amend its complaint as a matter of right after the case had been dismissed.14 
Before discussing the application of Rule 746-100-3 .D and the merits of Bear 
Hollow's argument, however, it is important to address the standard of review for this 
issue. Simply put, Bear Hollow misstated the standard of review in its brief by referring 
to it as a "general question[] of law" that the court should review under the "correction-
of-error standard." [See Appellant's Brief p. 3]. This issue involves the Commission's 
interpretation and application of its own procedural rules. As such, this Court "should 
employ an intermediate standard, one of some, but not total, deference." Resort 
Retainers v. Labor Comm'n., 2010 UT App 229, f 3, P.3d (internal quotation 
14
 Bear Hollow does cite Blauer v. Dep V of Workforce Servs., 2007 UT App 280, 167 
P.3d 1102. However, that case did not address whether a plaintiff can amend his 
complaint as a matter of right after an order of dismissal. Indeed, the word "complaint" 
does not appear anywhere in that opinion. 
marks and citation omitted) (reviewing agency's application of its rules). In other words, 
the Court should "review the Commission's application of its own rules for 
reasonableness and rationality." Id; see also Union Pacific R. Co. v. Auditing Div. of 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 876, 878 (Utah 1992) ("Because courts should uphold 
agency rules if they are reasonable and rational, courts should also uphold reasonable and 
rational departures from those rules . . . . We thus employ aft intermediate standard (one 
of some, but not total, deference) in reviewing Union Pacific's claim that the 
Commission erred in applying its rules."). Bear Hollow cannot establish that the 
Commission's ruling was either unreasonable or irrational.15 
Rule 746-100-3.D, like Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, generally 
provides that a party may amend its complaint before a responsive pleading has been 
filed.16 Compare Utah Admin. Code R746-100-3.D ("Initiatory pleadings may be 
amended without leave of the Commission at any time before a responsive pleading has 
been filed or the time for filing the pleading has expired.") with Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a) ("A 
party may amend his pleadings once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive 
pleading is served . . . ."). However, neither Rule 746-100-3.D nor Rule 15(a) allows a 
party to amend its complaint as a matter of right after the case has been dismissed in its 
15
 Even if the Court reviewed this issue using the "correction-of-error standard" that Bear 
Hollow advocates, the Court still should affirm the Commission's ruling given the 
applicable legal principles. 
16
 Although Bear Hollow's brief does not address the issue, the Individual Shareholders 
concede that a motion to dismiss, by itself, does not constitute a "responsive pleading." 
See generally Turville v. J&JProperties, L.C., 2006 UT App 305, % 28, 145 P.3d 1146 
("Utah courts have held that a motion to dismiss does not constitute a responsive pleading 
. . . .")• 
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entirety. In fact, the Utah appellate courts repeatedly have rejected such arguments. See 
Turville v. J&JProperties, L.C., 2006 UT App 305, % 28, 145 P.3d 1146 ("Utah courts 
have also held that once a trial court enters a final order of dismissal, a party loses all 
rights to amend its complaint . . . ."); National Adver., Co. v. Murray City Corp., 2006 
UT App 75, f 13, 131 P.3d 872 ("In Utah, upon occurrence of a final adjudication, and 
thereafter, a [party] may not file an amended complaint." (alteration in original)); Suarez 
v Friel, 2005 UT App 396, \ 5 n.l, 2005 WL 2303797 (same); Nichols v. State, 554 P.3d 
231, 232 (Utah 1976) ("[A]n order of dismissal is a final adjudication, and thereafter a 
plaintiff may not file an amended complaint.").17 
These rulings from the Utah appellate courts are in agreement with the courts 
outside of this state, and in particular with the federal courts. See, e.g., Haagensen v. 
Supreme Court ofPenn., No. 09-1957, 2010 WL 3157139 at *2 (3d. Cir. Aug. 11, 2010) 
(rejecting motion to amend where "[Plaintiff] attempted to file her Amended Complaint 
on March 27, 2009, long after the District Court granted the Motion to Dismiss on March 
3, 2009"); Liobmedia, LLC v. Dataflow/Alaska, Inc., 349 Fed. Appx. 843, 846 (4th Cir. 
2009) ("A post-judgment motion to amend a complaint may only be granted where the 
judgment dismissing the complaint is first vacated . . . ."); Cooper v. Shumway, 780 F.2d 
27, 29 (10th Cir. 1985) ("A motion to dismiss is treated like a responsive pleading when 
final judgment is entered before plaintiff files an amended complaint."); Morse v. 
17
 There is no question that the Commission's order of dismissal was final at the time it 
was entered. See generally Heber Light & Power Co. v. Utah Public Service Comrn'n., 
2010 UT 27, f 7, 231 P.3d 1203 (Utah 2010) (articulating "three-part test to determine 
whether an agency decision qualifies as final agency action"). 
McWhorter, 290 F.3d 795, 799 (6m Cir. 2002) ("Following entry of a final judgment, a 
party may not seek to amend their complaint without first qioving to alter, set aside or 
vacate judgment."); Lindauer v. Rogers, 91 F.3d 1355, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[0]nce 
judgment has been entered in a case, a motion to amend the complaint can only be 
entertained if the judgment is first reopened"); see also Wright & Miller, et al., 6 Federal 
Practice and Procedure Civ. § 1489 (3d ed. 2010) ("[A] party desiring to amend after 
judgment has been entered is obliged first to obtain relief from the judgment. . . ."). See 
generally Nat'I Advertising Co., 2006 UT App 75, f 13 ("Utah's rule is consistent with 
federal court holdings . . . ."). 
Bear Hollow does not address this uniform body of law. Instead, Bear Hollow 
argues that giving it a second bite at the apple by allowing it to file an amended 
1 O 
complaint "would have conserved judicial resources." [App. Brief at p. 50]. In fact, 
the opposite is true. By the time Bear Hollow filed its amerided complaint, the case had 
been pending for six months. The Commission had spent substantial time and effort 
reviewing Bear Hollow's original, 25-page Complaint and its 21 exhibits, considering 
Bear Hollow further argues that the Commission continued to have jurisdiction over 
the case at the time Bear Hollow filed its amended complaint, because the request for 
rehearing stayed the time for filing an appeal. However, the Commission only retained 
jurisdiction in order to allow Bear Hollow to seek reconsideration of the Commission's 
its prior ruling-which did not include Bear Hollow's purported amended complaint. 
Furthermore, the rule prohibiting a plaintiff from filing an amended complaint after 
dismissal is not based on the principles of jurisdiction, but rather on the preservation of 
judicial resources. See, e.g., 6 Fed. Prac & Proc. Civ. § 14$9. Indeed, even when only 
part of a complaint has been dismissed, and therefore there ijas been no "final" order and 
the tribunal retains jurisdiction over the entire case, the plaintiff still cannot amend his 
complaint as a matter of right. See Turville, 2006 UT App 305, f 28 (collecting cases and 
recognizing that "the right to amend as a matter of course . . . [also] terminates with a 
non-final order of dismissal"). 
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two motions to dismiss and six memoranda addressing the same, participating in a two 
hour hearing, and drafting a 16 page order of dismissal. Allowing Bear Hollow to 
unilaterally moot these efforts by filing an after-the-fact amended complaint simply 
ignores the costs incurred and time spent addressing Bear Hollow's original Complaint. 
Moreover, adopting Bear Hollow's position on appeal would encourage plaintiffs 
appearing before the Commission to file overbroad or incomplete initial pleadings, with 
the assurance that they could always file an amended complaint and simply try again later 
if needed.19 Cf. 6 Fed. Prac & Proc. Civ. § 1489 (recognizing that allowing a party to 
amend its pleadings after a ruling on the merits "would enable the liberal amendment 
policy of Rule 15(a) to be employed in a way that is contrary to the philosophy favoring 
finality of judgments and the expeditious termination of litigation"); accord The Tool 
Box, Inc. v. Ogden City Corp., 419 F.3d 1084, 1087-88 (10th Cir. 2005); Natl 
Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt Sheaf 930 F.2d 240, 245 (2d Cir. 1991); see also 
State Trading Corp. of India, Ltd. v. Assuranceforeningen Skuld, 921 F.2d 409, 418 (2d 
Cir. 1990) ("[A] busy district court need not allow itself to be imposed upon by the 
presentation of theories seriatim." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although it is 
undisputed that Bear Hollow could have amended its Complaint while the Commission 
was considering the motions to dismiss, it is also undisputed that Bear Hollow did not 
utilize this opportunity. Instead, Bear Hollow waited six months, briefed the dispositive 
issues presented to the Commission, participated in a hearing on the same, waited for the 
19
 In fact, because R.746-100-3.D (unlike Rule 15(a)) does not contain any restriction on 
how many times plaintiff may amend its pleading, Bear Hollow's argument would 
potentially allow this process to occur ad infinitum. 
Commission's ruling, and then sought a second bite at the apple after it lost its case. It 
should not be rewarded for such dilatory tactics. 
The Commission's application of Rule 746-100-3.D was neither 
unreasonable nor irrational. Rather, it recognized the work that already had been 
performed in the case, prevented plaintiffs from seeking a second bite at the apple, and 
followed the declarations of this Court and every other court that has examined this type 
of issue. As such, the Commission's ruling on this issue should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the 
Individual Shareholders. Bear Hollow did not allege or establish that the Individual 
Shareholders each independently own or control a water system; nor did Bear Hollow 
allege or establish that the Individual Shareholders offer water to the public generally. 
Both of these failures prevent a finding that the Individual Shareholders are a public 
utility as defined by Utah Code, and therefore prevent the Commission from exercising 
jurisdiction over the Individual Shareholders. The Commission further acted reasonably 
and rationally when it denied Bear Hollow's attempt to unilaterally amend its Complaint 
nearly a month after the entire case had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. For these 
reasons, the Commission's orders should be affirmed. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 54. Public Utilities 
* ! Chapter 4. Authority of Commission Over Public Utilities 
-* § 54-4-1. General jurisdiction 
The commission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise an|d regulate every public utility in 
this state, and to supervise all of the business of every such public utility in this state, and to do ail things, 
whether herein specifically designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary or convenient in the exercise 
of such power and jurisdiction; provided, however, that the Department of Transportation shall have jurisdiction 
over those safety functions transferred to it by the Department of Transportation Act. [FN1 ] 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1917, c. 47, art. 4, § l;Laws 1975, 1st Sp.Sess., c. 9, § 15. 
Codifications C.L. 1917, § 4798; R.S. 1933, § 76-4-1; C. 1943, § 76-4-1. 
[FN1] Section 72-1-101 et seq. 
Current through 2010 General Session 
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gfc>v. Works. 
Westlaw. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 54-2-1 Page 1 
p> 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 54. Public Utilities 
*il Chapter 2. Definitions (Refs & Annos) 
-*. § 54-2-1. Definitions 
As used in this title: 
(1) "Avoided costs" means the incremental costs to an electrical corporation of electric energy or capacity or 
both that, due to the purchase of electric energy or capacity or both from small power production or cogenera-
tion facilities, the electrical corporation would not have to generate itself or purchase from another electrical 
corporation. 
(2) "Cogeneration facility": 
(a) means a facility that produces: 
(i) electric energy; and 
(ii) steam or forms of useful energy, including heat, that are used for industrial, commercial, heating, or 
•cooling purposes; and 
(b) is a qualifying cogeneration facility under federal law. 
(3) "Commission" means the Public Service Commission of Utah. 
(4) "Commissioner" means a member of the commission. 
(5)(a) "Corporation" includes an association and a joint stock company having any powers or privileges not pos-
sessed by individuals or partnerships. 
(b) "Corporation" does not include towns, cities, counties, conservancy districts, improvement districts, or 
other governmental units created or organized under any general or special law of this state. 
(6) "Distribution electrical cooperative" includes an electrical corporation that: 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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(a) is a cooperative; 
(b) conducts a business that includes the retail distribution of electricity the cooperative purchases or gener-
ates for the cooperative's members; and 
(c) is required to allocate or distribute savings in excess of additions to reserves and surplus on the basis of 
patronage to the cooperative's: 
(i) members; or 
(ii) patrons. 
(7) "Electrical corporation" includes every corporation, cooperative association, and person, their lessees, trust-
ees, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any electric plant, or in any way furnishing elec-
tric power for public service or to its consumers or members for domestic, commercial, or industrial use, within 
this state, except independent energy producers, and except where electricity is generated on or distributed by 
the producer solely for the producer's own use, or the use of the producer's tenants, or for the use of members of 
an association of unit owners formed under Title 57, Chapter 8, Condominium Ownership Act, and not for sale 
to the public generally, and except where the electricity generated is consumed by an owner, lessor, or interest 
holder, or by an affiliate of an owner, lessor, or interest holder, who has provided at least $25,000,000 in value, 
including credit support, relating to the electric plant furnishing the electricity and whose consumption does not 
exceed its long-term entitlement in the plant under a long-term arrangement other than a power purchase agree-
ment, except a power purchase agreement with an electrical corporation. 
(8) "Electric plant" includes all real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or man-
aged in connection with or to facilitate the production, generation, transmission, delivery, or furnishing of elec-
tricity for light, heat, or power, and all conduits, ducts, or other devices, materials, apparatus, or property for 
containing, holding, or carrying conductors used or to be used for the transmission of electricity for light, heat, 
or power. 
(9) "Gas corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, con-
trolling, operating, or managing any gas plant for public service within this state or for the selling or furnishing 
of natural gas to any consumer or consumers within the state for domestic, commercial, or industrial use, except 
in the situation that: 
(a) gas is made or produced on, and distributed by the maker or producer through, private property: 
(i) solely for the maker's or producer's own use or the use of the maker's or producer's tenants; and 
(ii) not for sale to others; 
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(b) gas is compressed on private property solely for the owner's own use or the use of the owner's employees 
as a motor vehicle fuel; or 
(c) gas is compressed by a retailer of motor vehicle fuel on the retailer's property solely for sale as a motor 
vehicle fuel. 
(10) "Gas plant'1 includes all real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or managed 
in connection with or to facilitate the production, generation, transmission, delivery, or furnishing of gas, natural 
or manufactured, for light, heat, or power. 
(11) "Heat corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, 
controlling, operating, or managing any heating plant for public service within this state. 
(I2)(a) "Heating plant" includes all real estate, fixtures, machinery, appliances, and personal property con-
trolled, operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate the production, generation, transmission, deliv-
ery, or furnishing of artificial heat. 
(b) "Heating plant" does not include either small power production facilities or cogeneration facilities. 
(13) "Independent energy producer" means every electrical corporation, person, corporation, or government en-
tity, their lessees, trustees, or receivers, that own, operate, control, or manage an independent power production 
or cogeneration facility. 
(14) "Independent power production facility" means a facility that: 
(a) produces electric energy solely by the use, as a primary energy source, of biomass, waste, a renewable re-
source, a geothermal resource, or any combination of the preceding sources; or 
(b) is a qualifying power production facility. 
(15) "Private telecommunications system" includes all facilities for the transmission of signs, signals, writing, 
images, sounds, messages, data, or other information of any nature by wire, radio, lightwaves, or other electro-
magnetic means, excluding mobile radio facilities, that are owned, controlled, operated, or managed by a corpor-
ation or person, including their lessees, trustees, receivers, or trustees appointed by any court, for the use of that 
corporation or person and not for the shared use with or resale to any other corporation or person on a regular 
basis. 
(16)(a) "Public utility" includes every railroad corporation, gas corporation, electrical corporation, distribution 
electrical cooperative, wholesale electrical cooperative, telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, water cor-
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orie. US Gov. Works 
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poration, sewerage corporation, heat corporation, and independent energy producer not described in Subsection 
(16)(d), where the service is performed for, or the commodity delivered to, t^ie public generally, or in the case of 
a gas corporation or electrical corporation where the gas or electricity is soldi or furnished to any member or con-
sumers within the state for domestic, commercial, or industrial use. 
(b)(i) If any railroad corporation, gas corporation, electrical corporation, telephone corporation, telegraph cor-
poration, water corporation, sewerage corporation, heat corporation, or inqependent energy producer not de-
scribed in Subsection (16)(d), performs a service for or delivers a commodity to the public, it is considered to 
be a public utility, subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of the commission and this title. 
(ii) If a gas corporation, independent energy producer not described in Subsection (16)(d), or electrical cor-
poration sells or furnishes gas or electricity to any member or consumers within the state, for domestic, 
commercial, or industrial use, for which any compensation or payment is received, it is considered to be a 
public utility, subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of the commission and this title. 
(c) Any corporation or person not engaged in business exclusively as a public utility as defined in this section 
is governed by this title in respect only to the public utility owned, controlled, operated, or managed by the 
corporation or person, and not in respect to any other business or pursuit. 
(d) An independent energy producer is exempt from the jurisdiction and regulations of the commission with 
respect to an independent power production facility if it meets the requirements of Subsection (16)(d)(i), (ii), 
(iii), or (iv), or any combination of these: 
(i) the commodity or service is produced or delivered, or both, by an independent energy producer solely for 
the uses exempted in Subsection (7) or for the use of state-owned facilities; 
(ii) the commodity or service is sold by an independent energy producer solely to an electrical corporation 
or other wholesale purchaser; 
(iii)(A) the commodity or service produced or delivered by the independent energy producer is delivered to 
an entity that controls, is controlled by, or affiliated with the independent energy producer or to a user loc-
ated on real property managed or controlled by the independent energy jproducer; and 
(B) the real property on which the service or commodity is used is contiguous to real property which is 
owned or controlled by the independent energy producer. Parcels of rjeal property separated solely by pub-
lic roads or easements for public roads shall be considered as contiguous for purposes of this Subsection 
(16); or 
(iv) the independent energy producer: 
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(A) supplies energy for direct consumption by a customer that is: 
(I) a county, municipality, city, town, other political subdivision, local district, special service district, 
state institution of higher education, school district, charter school, or any entity within the state system 
of public education; or 
(II) an entity qualifying as a charitable organization under 26 U.S.C. Sec. 501(c)(3) operated for reli-
gious, charitable, or educational purposes that is exempt from federal income tax and able to demon-
strate its tax-exempt status; 
(B) supplies energy to the customer through use of a customer generation system, as defined in Section 
54-15-102, for use on the real property where the customer generation system is located; 
(C) supplies energy using a customer generation system designed to supply the lesser of: 
(I) no more than 90% of the average annual consumption of electricity by the customer at that site, 
based on an annualized billing period; or 
(II) the maximum size allowable under net metering provisions, defined in Section 54-15-102; 
(D) notifies the customer before installing the customer generation system of: 
(I) all costs the customer is required to pay for the customer generation system, including any intercon-
nection costs; and 
(II) the potential for future changes in amounts paid by the customer for energy received from the pub-
lic utility and the possibility of changes to the customer fees or charges to the customer associated with 
net metering and generation; 
(E) enters into and performs in accordance with an interconnection agreement with a public utility provid-
ing retail electric service where the real property on which the customer generation system is located, with 
the rates, terms, and conditions of the retail service and interconnection agreement subject to approval by 
the governing authority of the public utility, as defined in Subsection 54-15-102(8); and 
(F) installs the relevant customer generation system by December 31, 2015. 
(e) Any person or corporation defined as an electrical corporation or public utility under this section may con-
tinue to serve its existing customers subject to any order or future determination of the commission in refer-
ence to the right to serve those customers. 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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(f)(0 "Public utility" does not include any person that is otherwise considered a public utility under this Sub-
section (16) solely because of that person's ownership of an interest in an felectric plant, cogeneration facility, 
or small power production facility in this state if all of the following conditions are met: 
(A) the ownership interest in the electric plant, cogeneration facility, or small power production facility is 
leased to: 
(I) a public utility, and that lease has been approved by the commission; 
(II) a person or government entity that is exempt from commission (regulation as a public utility; or 
(III) a combination of Subsections (16)(f)(i)(A)(I) and (II); 
(B) the lessor of the ownership interest identified in Subsection (16)(f)(i)(A) is: 
(I) primarily engaged in a business other than the business of a public utility; or 
(II) a person whose total equity or beneficial ownership is held directly or indirectly by another person 
engaged in a business other than the business of a public utility; anp 
(C) the rent reserved under the lease does not include any amount based on or determined by revenues or 
income of the lessee. 
(ii) Any person that is exempt from classification as a public utility under Subsection (16)(f)(D shall contin-
ue to be so exempt from classification following termination of the lessjee's right to possession or use of the 
electric plant for so long as the former lessor does not operate the electric plant or sell electricity from the 
electric plant. If the former lessor operates the electric plant or sells electricity, the former lessor shall con-
tinue to be so exempt for a period of 90 days following termination, or for a longer period that is ordered by 
the commission. This period may not exceed one year. A change in rates that would otherwise require com-
mission approval may not be effective during the 90-day or extended period without commission approval. 
(g) "Public utility" does not include any person that provides financing for, but has no ownership interest in an 
electric plant, small power production facility, or cogeneration facility. In the event of a foreclosure in which 
an ownership interest in an electric plant, small power production facility, or cogeneration facility is trans-
ferred to a third-party financer of an electric plant, small power production facility, or cogeneration facility, 
then that third-party financer is exempt from classification as a public utility for 90 days following the fore-
closure, or for a longer period that is ordered by the commission. This period may not exceed one year. 
(h)(i) The distribution or transportation of natural gas for use as a motor vehicle fuel does not cause the dis-
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tributor or transporter to be a "public utility," unless the commission, after notice and a public hearing, de-
termines by rule that it is in the public interest to regulate the distributers or transporters, but the retail sale 
alone of compressed natural gas as a motor vehicle fuel may not cause the seller to be a "public utility." 
(ii) In determining whether it is in the public interest to regulate the distributors or transporters, the commis-
sion shall consider, among other things, the impact of the regulation on the availability and price of natural 
gas for use as a motor fuel. 
(i) "Public utility" does not include any corporation, cooperative association, or person, their affiliates, less-
ees, trustees, or receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing an electric plant or in any way fur-
nishing electricity if the electricity is consumed by an owner, lessor, or interest holder or by an affiliate of 
an owner, lessor, or interest holder, who has provided at least $25,000,000 in value, including credit sup-
port, relating to the electric plant furnishing the electricity and whose consumption does not exceed its long-
term entitlement in the plant under a long-term arrangement other than a power purchase agreement, except 
a power purchase agreement with an electrical corporation. 
(17) "Purchasing utility" means any electrical corporation that is required to purchase electricity from small 
power production or cogeneration facilities pursuant to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, 16 U.S.C. 
Section 824a-3. 
(18) "Qualifying power producer" means a corporation, cooperative association, or person, or the lessee, trustee, 
and receiver of the corporation, cooperative association, or person, who owns, controls, operates, or manages 
any qualifying power production facility or cogeneration facility. 
(19) "Qualifying power production facility" means a facility that: 
(a) produces electrical energy solely by the use, as a primary energy source, of biomass, waste, a renewable 
resource, a geothermal resource, or any combination of the preceding sources; 
(b) has a power production capacity that, together with any other facilities located at the same site, is no great-
er than 80 megawatts; and 
(c) is a qualifying small power production facility under federal law. 
(20) "Railroad" includes every commercial, interurban, and other railway, other than a street railway, and each 
branch or extension of a railway, by any power operated, together with all tracks, bridges, trestles, rights-
of-way, subways, tunnels, stations, depots, union depots, yards, grounds, terminals, terminal facilities, struc-
tures, and equipment, and all other real estate, fixtures, and personal property of every kind used in connection 
with a railway owned, controlled, operated, or managed for public service in the transportation of persons or 
property. 
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(21) "Railroad corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, 
controlling, operating, or managing any railroad for public service within this state. 
(22)(a) "Sewerage corporation" includes every corporation and person, their1 lessees, trustees, and receivers, 
owning, controlling, operating, or managing any sewerage system for public service within this state. 
(b) "Sewerage corporation" does not include private sewerage companies bngaged in disposing of sewage only 
for their stockholders, or towns, cities, counties, conservancy districts, improvement districts, or other govern-
mental units created or organized under any general or special law of this ptate. 
(23) "Telegraph corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, own-
ing, controlling, operating, or managing any telegraph line for public service within this state. 
(24) "Telegraph line" includes all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments, and appliances, and all other 
real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or nianaged in connection with or to fa-
cilitate communication by telegraph, whether that communication be had with or without the use of transmission 
wires. 
(25)(a) "Telephone corporation" means any corporation or person, and their lessees, trustee, receivers, or trust-
ees appointed by any court, who owns, controls, operates, manages, or resells a public telecommunications ser-
vice as defined in Section 54-8b-2. 
(b) "Telephone corporation" does not mean a corporation, partnership, or firm providing: 
(i) intrastate telephone service offered by a provider of cellular, personal communication systems (PCS), or 
other commercial mobile radio service as defined in 47 U.S.C. Sec. 332 that has been issued a covering li-
cense by the Federal Communications Commission; 
(ii) Internet service; or 
(iii) resold intrastate toll service. 
(26) "Telephone line" includes all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments, and appliances, and all oth-
er real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to 
facilitate communication by telephone whether that communication is had with or without the use of transmis-
sion wires. 
(27) "Transportation of persons" includes every service in connection with or incidental to the safety, comfort, 
or convenience of the person transported, and the receipt, carriage, and delivery of that person and that person's 
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baggage. 
(28) "Transportation of property'* includes every service in connection with or incidental to the transportation of 
property, including in particular its receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer, switching, carriage, ventilation, refri-
geration, icing, dunnage, storage, and hauling, and the transmission of credit by express companies. 
(29) "Water corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, 
controlling, operating, or managing any water system for public service within this state. It does not include 
private irrigation companies engaged in distributing water only to their stockholders, or towns, cities, counties, 
water conservancy districts, improvement districts, or other governmental units created or organized under any 
general or special law of this state. 
(30)(a) "Water system" includes all reservoirs, tunnels, shafts, dams, dikes, headgates, pipes, flumes, canals, 
structures, and appliances, and all other real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled, operated, 
or managed in connection with or to facilitate the diversion, development, storage, supply, distribution, sale, fur-
nishing, carriage, appointment, apportionment, or measurement of water for power, fire protection, irrigation, re-
clamation, or manufacturing, or for municipal, domestic, or other beneficial use. 
(b) "Water system" does not include private irrigation companies engaged in distributing water only to their 
stockholders. 
(31) "Wholesale electrical cooperative" includes every electrical corporation that is: 
(a) in the business of the wholesale distribution of electricity it has purchased or generated to its members and 
the public; and 
(b) required to distribute or allocate savings in excess of additions to reserves and surplus to members or pat-
rons on the basis of patronage. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1917, c. 47, art. 2, § l;Laws 1925, c. 12, § l;Laws 1948, 1st Sp.Sess., c. 7, § l;Laws 1957, c. 106, § 1; 
Laws 1959, c. 94, § l;Laws 1965, c. 106, § I; Laws 1969, c. 153, § l;Laws 1984, c. 50, § l;Laws 1985, c. 97, 
§ l;Laws 1985, c. 98, § l;Laws 1985, c. 180, § 1; Laws 1985, c. 188, § l;Laws 1985, c. 253, § l;Laws 1986, 
c. 13; Laws 1986, c. 194, §8; Laws 1986, c. 215, § l;Laws 1989, c. 20, § 1; Laws 1992, c. 227, § l;Laws 1995, 
c. 173, § 3,eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995,c.316,§ 6, eff. March 21, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 170, § 47, eff. July I, 
1996; Laws 2000, c. 55, § 1, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2001, c. 212, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2008, c. 374, § 
7, eff. Mar. 18, 2008; Laws 2010, c. 302, § 1, eff. March 29, 2010; Laws 2010, c. 390, § 1, eff. May 11,2010. 
Codifications C.L. 1917, § 4782; R.S. 1933 § 76-2-1; C. 1943, § 76-2-1. 
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Title 54. Public Utilities 
*[§ Chapter 7. Hearings, Practice, and Procedure 
- t § 54-7-15. Review or rehearing by commission-Application-Procedure—Prerequisite to court ac-
tion—Effect of commission decisions 
(1) Before seeking judicial review of the commission's action, any party, stockholder, bondholder, or other per-
son pecuniarily interested in the public utility who is dissatisfied with an order of the commission shall meet the 
requirements of this section. 
(2)(a) After any order or decision has been made by the commission, any party to the action or proceeding, any 
stockholder, bondholder, or other party pecuniarily interested in the public utility affected may apply for rehear-
ing of any matters determined in the action or proceeding. 
(b) An applicant may not urge or rely on any ground not set forth in the application in an appeal to any court. 
(c) Any application for rehearing not granted by the commission within 20 days is denied. 
(d)(i) If the commission grants any application for rehearing without suspending the order involved, the com-
mission shall issue its decision on rehearing within 20 days after final submission. 
(ii) If the commission fails to render its decision on rehearing within 20 days, the order involved is affirmed. 
(e) Unless an order of the commission directs that an order is stayed or postponed, an application for review or 
rehearing does not excuse any corporation or person from complying with and obeying any order or decision 
of the commission. 
(3) Any order or decision on rehearing that abrogates, changes, or modifies an original order or decision has the 
same effect as an original order or decision, but does not affect any right, or the enforcement of any right, 
arising from the original order or decision unless ordered by the commission. 
(4) An order of the commission, including a decision on rehearing: 
(a) has effect only with respect to a public utility that is an actual party to the proceeding in which the order is 
rendered; and 
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(b) does not determine any right, privilege, obligation, duty, constraint, burden, or responsibility with respect 
to a public utility that is not a party to the proceeding in which the order is [rendered unless, in accordance with 
Subsection 63G-3-201(6), the commission makes a rule that incorporates the one or more principles of law 
that: 
(i) are established by the order; 
(ii) are not in commission rules at the time of the order; and 
(iii) affect the right, privilege, obligation, duty, constraint, burden, or responsibility with respect to the pub-
lic utility. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1917, c. 47, art. 5, § 14; Laws 1981, c. 215, § 5; Laws 1987, c. 161, § io / ; Laws 2003, c. 200, § 3, eff. 
May 5, 2003; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 795, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2009, c. 347, § 10, eff. May 12, 2009. 
Codifications C.L. 1917, § 4833; R.S. 1933, § 76-6-15; C. 1943, § 76-6-15 
Current through 2010 General Session 
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Formal Complaint and 
Request for Agency Action of Bear Hollow 
Restoration, LLC against Leon H. Saunders; 
Landmark Pfaza Associates; Parley's Creek, 
Ltd.; Parley's Lane, Ltd.; Parley's Park; 
Stuart A. Knowles; Trilogy Limited, LP.; 
Trilogy Asset Management, Inc.; Land and 
Water Resources, Inc.; Lawrence R. 
Knowles Irrevocable Trust: Leon H. 
Saunders, Stuart A. Knowles and Trilogy 
Limited, L.P. d/b/a SK Resources, a Utah 
General Partnership and/or Joint Venture, 
Summit Water Distribution Company, a 
Utah Corporation. 
DOCKET NO. 09-015-01 
ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
ISSUED: February 4, 2010 
SUMMARY 
This matter is before the Commission on two Motions to Dismiss applicant Bear 
Hollow Restoration, LLC's (Bear Hollow) Complaint and Request for Agency Action. The 
Commission has reviewed the moving and responding papers. It also held oral argument on the 
matter on December 8, 2009. John Flitton argued Summit's Motion and Brent Hatch argued the 
individual shareholders' Motion. Craig Smith argued Bear Hollows opposition to Summit's 
Motion, and Daniel McDonald argued Bear Hollows' opposition to the shareholders' Motion. 
For the reasons below, the Commission grants the Motions to Disniiss. 
By The Commission: 
There are two Motions to Dismiss before the Comrriission. One made by 
respondents Leon H. Saunders; Landmark Plaza Associates; Parley's Creek, Ltd.; Parley's Lane, 
Ltd.; Parley's Park; Stuart A. Knowles; Trilogy Limited, L.P.; Trilogy Asset Management, Inc.; 
Land and Water Resources, Inc.; Lawrence R. Knowles Irrevocably Trust: Leon H. Saunders, 
^tuart A. Knowles and Trilogy Limited, L.P. d/b/a SK Resources (collectively Shareholders) and 
000023 
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a second made by respondent Summit Water Distribution Company (Summit). The 
shareholders and Summit made their Motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) ("lack of jurisdiction over 
the subject matter") and 12(b)(2) ("lack of jurisdiction over the person") of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Ut.R.Civ.P. 12(b). 
When considering the Motion to Dismiss and in ascertaining the facts needed to 
establish jurisdiction, the Commission must "'accept the factual allegations in the complaint as 
true and consider all reasonable inference to be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable 
to the plaintiff."' Ho v. Jim's Enters., 2001 UT63, ^ 6 (quoting Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764,766 
(Utah 1991)). However the sufficiency of the facts "must be determined by the facts pleaded 
rather than the conclusions stated." Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2001 
UT 25, \ 26. see Cf Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (in a civil rights case, where 
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was at issue, holding that courts are "'not bound 
to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation"' )(internal citations omitted), 
and Jackson v. Alexander,465 F.2d 1389, 1390 (10th Cir. 1972) (in a matter involving fraud and 
Rule 9, holding that mere legal conclusions need not be accepted as true)1. 
The Commission's Jurisdiction 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 states in relevant part that the Commission: 
is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public 
utility in this state, and to supervise all of the business of every such public utility in 
this state, and to do all things, whether herein specifically designated or in addition 
thereto, which are necessary or convenient in the exercise of such power and 
jurisdiction.. . . 
See Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, % 26 (holding that interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure are persuasive where the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are "substantially similar1' to the federal rules.) 
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A public utility "includes every water corporation ... . where the service is 
performed for, or the commodity delivered to, the public generally . . . ." U.C.A. § 54-2-l(16)(a). 
Water corporation "includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, 
owning, controlling, operating, or managing any water system for public service within this 
state. It does not include private irrigation companies engaged in (distributing water only to their 
stockholders,. . . ." U.C.A. § 54-2-1(29). Water system 
includes all reservoirs, tunnels, shafts, dams, dikes, headgatps, pipes, flumes, canals, 
structures, and appliances, and all other real estate, fixtures, and personal property 
owned, controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate the 
diversion, development, storage, supply, distribution, safe, furnishing, carriage, 
appointment, apportionment, or measurement of water for power, fire protection, 
irrigation, reclamation, or manufacturing, or for municipal, domestic, or other 
beneficial use. 
U.C.A. § 54-2-l(30)(a). Water system "does not include private irrigation companies engaged in 
distributing water only to their stockholders." U.C.A. § 54-2-l(30)(b). 
"The PSC has no inherent regulatory powers [and]. . . . 'any reasonable doubt of 
the existence of any power must be resolved against the exercise thereof.'" Williams v. Public 
Serv. Comm fn., 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988) (internal citations omitted). 
The Shareholders' Motion 
The shareholders moved to dismiss the Complaint! filed with the Commission. 
The shareholders argued the Commission lacked jurisdiction over them, as they were not a 
"public utility" but merely held shares in an entity which Bear Hallow alleged was a public 
utility. The shareholders also argued that even if they individually owned or operated a water 
system, such operation was not for "the public generally.'1 
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The shareholders claim that Bear Hollow alleges the Commission has jurisdiction 
because the shareholders hold Class A shared in Summit. The shareholders argue that while they 
might have an interest in Summit as a corporation, they have no interest in or control over the 
specific assets of the corporation (i.e. the water system), and cite to Dansie v. City of Herriman 
2006 UT 23, for support. The shareholders argue that mere interest in a water corporation is not 
enough to convey jurisdiction to the Commission. 
Bear Hollow argues that Summit's reliance on "general corporate law is 
irrelevant." Memo, in Opp. to Shareholders' Motion, p.2. fn.4. It cites to Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation Co., 879 P.2d 248, 251 (Utah 1994), for the proposition that stock 
in a water company "is really a certificate showing an undivided part ownership in a certain 
water supply . . . ." It then concludes that because Summit's Articles of Incorporation give 
shareholders "a proportionate share but specific interest in the corporation's domestic and 
culinary water", that then gives shareholders "an ownership interest in [Summit's] water 
system"—i.e. its assets. Id. 
Regarding the shareholders, Bear Hollow asks, in part, the following relief of the 
Commission: 
134. Based upon the foregoing, Bear Hollow respectfully requests that the 
Commission commence a Commission inquiry as to whether all the other 
Respondents, including, but not limited to, Saunders, Knowles, the Saunders and 
Knowles Entities, and SK Resources should be regulated as a public utility or qualify 
for exemption from Commission regulation pursuant to Utah Administrative Rule 
R746-331-L 
135. Bear Hollow requests an order from the Commission finding that the other 
Respondents, particularly SK Resources, are public utilities subject to Commission 
regulation because Respondents—particularly Saunders, Knowles, and SK 
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Resources—are providing culinary water to consumers but none of the Respondents 
is operating as a non-profit corporation, in good standing with the Division of 
Corporations. 
Bear Hollow Complaint and Request for Agency Action (Complaint), f^ J 134-135. 
Bear Hollow's claims that the shareholders are subject to the Commission's 
jurisdiction are based, in part, on the following allegations: 
• Leon Saunders is Summit's "largest Class A shareholder, its President, and a 
member of its board of directors, Complaint at f 3 j 
Landmark Plaza Associates is owned or controlled by Saunders and is a Class A 
shareholder of Summit, Id. at f^ 4; 
• Parley's Creek, Ltd. is owned or controlled by Saunders and is a Class A 
shareholder of Summit, Id. at f 5; 
• Parley's Lane is owned or controlled by Saunders and is a Class A shareholder of 
Summit, Id. at \ 6; 
• Parley's Park is owned or controlled by Saunders and is a Class A shareholder of 
Summit, Id. at % 7; 
• Stuart Knowles is a "Class A shareholder and director of Summit and is an officer 
and or owns a controlling interest in Trilogy Limited, Id. at J^ 9; 
Trilogy Limited is owned or controlled by Knowles, a Class A shareholder of 
Summit, Id. atf 10; 
• Trilogy Asset Management is owned or controlled by Knowles. It is the general 
partner of Trilogy Limited, Id. at % 11; 
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• Land and Water Resources, Inc. is a Class A shareholder of Summit, owned or 
controlled by Knowles, and merged with Trilogy Limited in 2007, Id at f 12; 
• Lawrence R. Knowles Irrevocable Trust is a Class A shareholder of Summit and 
controlled or managed by Knowles, Id. at Tf 13. 
A review of the allegations in the complaint show that Bear Hollow contends the 
Commission has jurisdiction to commence an investigation and ultimately issue an order finding 
that the shareholders are public utilities, because they own shares in Summit, which Bear Hollow 
claims is a public utility. 
However, Bear Hollow''s jurisdictional allegations regarding the shareholders as a 
"public utility", "water corporation," or "water system", are legal conclusions which the 
Commission is not required to accept as true for purposes of determining these Motions. See 
Franco, 2001 UT 25 at \ 26, Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1950, and Jackson, 465 F.2d at 1390. Even 
reviewing the allegations cited at the hearing (ffl[ 16, 18, 21, 22, 39, 40, 41, 44, see Transcript of 
Hearing, pp. 55-57) there is no factual allegation that any of them, individually or collectively, 
is a water company serving the public or that any—individually or collectively, own or control a 
water system serving the public. Even assuming the conclusions are true, they allege only that 
the shareholders have shares in Summit, which in turn is allegedly a "public utility", "water 
corporation," or "water system". "'Ordinarily a corporation is regarded as a separate and distinct 
legal entity from its stockholders. This is true whether the corporation has many stockholders or 
only one.'" DeGrazio v. Legal Title Co., 2006 UT App 183, ^1 (quoting Colman v. Colman, 743 
P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). The Court in Dansie v. City ofHerriman, 2006 UT 23 (which 
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both parties cited), dealt with a similar situation. There, the Court clarified that the Herriman 
water company's articles of incorporation entitled shareholders "to use Company water but gave 
them no ownership interest in Company assets"—that "shareholders are promised equal 
participation not in the ownership, but rather in the use of Company assets/' Dansie, 2006 UT 
23, f*|[ 2, 8 (emphasis in original). While the shareholders might have an interest in Summit as a 
corporation, that does not, by itself, give them an interest or control over specific assets . In fact 
as Bear Hollow has itself alleged "Class A development shares represent a proportionate but 
specific interest in the corporations' domestic and culinary; water, including the contributed 
source site, source, and source capacity, but no interest whatsoever in the corporation 's water 
distribution works, e.g. water diversion facilities, pipeline, water storage facilities, appurtenant 
works, etc. . . ." Complaint, |^ 77 (emphasis added). The shareholders' mere interest in Summit 
is not enough to convey jurisdiction over them to the Commission, either to commence an 
investigation or to enter an order asserting jurisdiction sufficient t0 regulate them as public 
utilities. 
Bear Hollow argues that it "does not assert that the Commission has jurisdiction 
over the Sanders/Knowles Respondents merely because they own shares in [Summit]." Memo, 
in Opp. to Shareholders' Motion, p. 3. Bear Hollow claims the Commission has jurisdiction 
because of a separate reason: "the Complaint clearly establishes that the Saunders/Knowles 
Respondents are named parties to this proceeding based on their control of [Summit], which 
thereby qualifies them as a 'water corporation' pursuant to Sectioti 54-2-1." Memo, in Opp. to 
Shareholders' Motion, p. 3 (emphasis in original). Bear Hollow points to other allegations in its 
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Complaint to show that the shareholders "own or control" Summit." Id. For example, Bear 
Hollow alleges: "[Summit] is a non-profit in form only. In substance, Summit and [the 
Saunders/Knowles] Respondents operate a vast, for-profit enterprise controlled and orchestrated 
by Saunders and Knowles and/or the Saunders Entities and Knowles Entities." Id. at f 25 
(emphasis in original); together, Saunders and Knowles own and/or control 80.1% of all Class A 
shares and 51.9% of all outstanding shares", Id. at % 26; [Summit] ... issued at least 2,819 more 
Class A shares to Saunders and Knowles and/or the Saunders and Knowles so that Saunders and 
Knowles and Knowles Entities could, once again, manipulate and dominate [Summit]" Id. at f 
44. Because "ordinarily a corporation is regarded as a separate and distinct legal entity from its 
stockholders," DeGrazio, 2006 UT App 183 at *1, Bear Hollow must establish that the 
shareholders, especially Saunders and Knowles, "control", "own", and "manipulate and 
dominate" Summit, i.e. establish a claim of alter ego2,3 for the Commission to consider 
investigating them as a potential public utility and consider asserting jurisdiction over them. 
However, "the conditions under which the corporate entity may be disregarded [under the alter 
ego doctrine] vary . . . as the doctrine is essentially an equitable one and for that reason is 
particularly within the province of the trial court" Shaw v. Bailey-McCune Co., 355 P.2d 321, 
322 (Utah 1960) (emphasis added). The Commission, however, is not a court of equity, see In 
At the hearing, Bear Hollow's counsel stated: "Essentially what we're saying there is that they're an alter 
ego; they manipulate, dominate, and control the company . . . . That's basic corporate law, and that's a theory that's 
never been alleged . . . in this forum." 
See Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, ^ | 36 (defining the alter ego theory as one 
where the corporate form is disregarded "when there is 'such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist.'" internal citations omitted). 
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the Matter of the Complaint of Union Telephone Co. v. Qwest Corporation, 2005 Utah PUC 
LEXIS 255, *3 (stating that "this Commission does not possess equitable powers."), and cannot 
grant the primary relief sought by Bear Hollow, which is to obtaini regulation of the shareholders. 
Relative to the exercise of its jurisdiction to regulate public utilities and the 
provision of water utility service, and in determining whether an ehtity should be exempt from 
Commission regulation, the Commission does consider "ownership and control of assets" and 
"ownership and voting control of the entity", Utah Admin. Code. R. 746-33 l-l(B)(l)-(2). But the 
Commission looks at "control" affecting the reasonableness of price and service, and from the 
perspective of a water consumer. Issues of price and quality of service rendered to a water 
consumer are areas within Commission jurisdiction and which the Commission may remedy. 
A review of the underlying nature of Bear Hollow's claims, however, show that 
Bear Hollow's claims regarding the shareholder's "control" of Summit is used to lead the 
Commission to intercede in issues involving coiporate governance, shareholder disputes, 
contractual disputes, business torts, etc. Issues such as these (althpugh they may have merit) 
which do not involve the provision of service affecting consumer interests, or other areas 
typically under Commission jurisdiction, are not within the Comnfussion's jurisdiction to 
remedy. The Commission concludes, that Bear Hollow's substantive claims are outside the 
Commission's jurisdiction to remedy. 
The parties should understand that the Commission's decision does not make a 
determination as to whether any or some of the shareholders do ot do not "own, control, 
manipulate or dominate" Summit, i.e. whether Summit is the alter ego of some or all of the 
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shareholders. Nor does it make any finding as to underlying claims raised by Bear Hollow. It 
only determines the Commission is not the proper forum to remedy the substantive issues Bear 
Hollows raises in its Complaint, as those are properly addressed in a trial court. 
Summit's Motion 
Summit water also asked the Complaint be dismissed, arguing the Commission 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over Summit as no new facts been 
presented, because Summit does not provide water to the general public, and because Summit 
qualified for an exemption in any case, and any new investigation should be declined. 
Bear Hollow argues that Summit is subject to Commission jurisdiction because it 
does serve the public generally, it markets its services to the general public, is not operating as a 
true non-profit, and changed circumstances merit a new investigation into Summit. 
Some of the factual allegations regarding Summit deal with its status as a non-
profit water corporation. Bear Hollow claims that although Summit is "organized and registered 
under the laws of Utah as a non-profit corporation", Complaint, % 2, "it is a non-profit in form 
only" and "operates a vast, for-profit enterprise . . . ." Id. at f 25. Additionally, Bear Hollow 
alleges that there are materially changed circumstances and/or newly discovered evidence 
involving alleged lack of control of assets, and alleged changes in share distribution that require 
renewed Commission investigation and, ultimately, regulation. 
For purposes of this Motion, assuming as true the allegations that Summit is a 
"non-profit in form only" and allegations the changes in share distribution disrupt the 
commonality of interest requirement, the allegations must still show that Summit serves the 
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public generally. Service to the public is discussed in a line of opinions cited by the parties, e.g. 
Garkane, Nelson, etc. For puiposes of this Order, however, the Commission finds the following 
language from Garkane useful: "If the business or concern is not public service, where the 
public has not a legal right to the use of it, where the business or operation is not open to an 
indefinite public, it is not subject to the jurisdiction or regulation of the commission. . . ." 
Garkane Power Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 100 P.2d 571, 572 (Utah 1940). "It is 
only by the presence of such factor or element that the commission has power or authority to 
regulate or control such business. Eliminating it, its power and jurisdiction are gone." State ex 
rel Public Utilities Comm 'n v. Nelson, 238 P. 237 (Utah 1925). A review of the Complaint 
shows that although Bear Hollow makes several conclusory legal allegations, alleging Summit is 
serving the public, there is no factual allegation that Summit provides services directly to anyone 
other than shareholders.4 For example, Paragraph 16 and 18 allege simply that Summit is a 
"public utility" and a "water corporation" and that the Commission has jurisdiction over Summit. 
Paragraph 21 does state that Summit "has provided or attempted to provide and fulfill the 
essential public use and purpose of providing water and water service lor . . . uses in western 
Summit County, Utah." Complaint, at f 21. The Commission is spemingly required to accept 
this factual allegation as tme. A review of the remainder of the Complaint, however, reveals that 
this a legal conclusion. The thrust of the allegations in the Complaint is that Summit provides 
water "in western Summit County", by "selling their Class A sharjes . . . . " See e.g. Complaint, 
Bear Hollow makes several factual allegations regarding Summit's alleged service to the public in its 
responses to the Motions to Dismiss. However, those allegations are made out$ide of the pleadings, not in the 
Complaint. The Commission deals with those allegations below. 
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Uf 26-39, 41, 45, 59, 73, etc. There is no allegation that Summit delivers its water directly to 
non-shareholders, or any allegations that it directly serves non-shareholders. In fact, paragraph 
26 of the Complaint points to Exhibit A in setting forth its allegation regarding ownership of 
shares. That list, however, is titled "Shareholder List." Absent any allegation that would 
factually allege that Summit serves those who are not shareholders, the Commission cannot 
assert jurisdiction—even for an investigation, and must dismiss. 
Bear Hollow made several factual allegations outside of the pleadings arguing for 
Commission jurisdiction. First, Bear Hollow claimed that Summit provided water to "public 
facilities, including the Park City School District and the U.S. Post Office" Memo in Opp. to 
Summit Water's Motion, p.4., and that it "provides water service to apartment complexes . . . 
which offer[] apartments for rent to the general public in Park City, Utah, as well as time-share 
resorts . . . ." Id. It stated that consequently, "any member of the public visiting the public 
facilities serviced by [Summit] will receive the water services provided by [Summit], regardless 
of their lack of shares in [Summit]." Id. However, the term "pleading", as defined in our Rules 
of Civil Procedure, does not encompass a motion under Rule 12 nor a response to a Motion. See 
Ut.RyCiv.P. 7(a), (b)(1). Therefore those allegations cannot be properly considered as part of the 
Complaint's allegations. 
Even if the Commission were to consider the allegations in the Memorandum, 
however, they would not be enough to require the Commission to deny the Motions and 
commence an investigation. The basis for Bear Hollow's claims of public service by Summit as 
cited above are based on the shareholder list attached to the Complaint as Exhibit A. The 
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shareholder list reveals the School District, Post Office, apartment complexes, and times shares 
mentioned show the entities receive their water as just that— shareholders, not as general 
members of the public. The Commission does not agree that because such shareholders in turn 
deliver water to general members of the public—i.e. customers, patrons, tenants, etc., Summit 
can then be considered a public utility, or that such allegations show it has established service to 
the public generally. None of these contentions allege that anyone other than shareholders 
directly receive service from Summit. 
Second, Bear Hollow also claims another reason for the Commission to regulate 
Summit is because it cannot "reserve the power to approve or reject any application for 
membership in the Company." Memo in Opp. to Summit Water's Motion, p.3. Although 
Summit might not have the ability to control to whom a shareholder sells its interest, Summit 
does retain the power to reject anyone that is not willing to meet the requirements imposed on 
shareholders. As pointed out by Bear Hollow, Summit's "Bylaws provide that [Summit] must 
transfer the share of stock to the purchaser so long as the purchaser agrees to comply with 
[Summit's] articles and bylaws, pays a small transfer fee and resumption of use fee, and all past 
assessments have been paid." Id p.3-4, fh.4. Even if the requirements are minimal, so long as 
Summit serves only its shareholders, it is not serving the public generally. See Garkane, 100 
P.2d at 573 (holding that it does not matter that membership is ea$y to obtain "provided the 
arrangement is a bona fide cooperative or private service organization and is not a device 
prepared and operated to evade or circumvent the law.") 
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Third, Bear Hollow also claims Summit is subject to Commission jurisdiction 
because it markets its services to the general public and because "in some areas of Summit 
County served by [Summit], like Jeremy Ranch, [Summit] is the only water service provider." 
Memo in Opp. to Summit Water's Motion, p.4. The Commission does not believe these factors 
warrant Commission investigation in this matter at this time. The Court in Garkane, in 
delineating between "public use" and "private use", commented on the then-Commission's 
argument for jurisdiction over Garkane. The Commission argued that Garkane was a public 
utility in part because "membership in Garkane is easy to obtain and that actually the 
Corporation solicits membership and has apparently accepted thus far all who paid their fee and 
agreed to pay the monthly minimum." Id. at 573 (emphasis added). The Court stated that "this 
[did] not. . . change the character of the service to be rendered." Id. "So long as the cooperative 
serves only its owner-members and so long as it has the right to select those who become 
members, ordinarily it matters not that 5 or 1000 people are members or that a few or all the 
people in a given area are accorded membership . . . ." Id. Even if Summit markets its services, 
and even if it is the only provider in some areas it serves, there is no allegation that Summit 
serves anyone other than shareholders. It does not serve the public generally and absent that 
"essential feature [i.e. that it is] open to the indefinite public", Garkane, 100 P.2d at 573, the 
Commission does not have jurisdiction to commence an inquiry or otherwise assert jurisdiction 
at this time. 
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The allegations that Summit does not in fact operate as a non-profit corporation, 
raises some valid questions.D However, determining if Summit has violated the laws governing 
non-profit water corporations, despite Bear Hollow's own allegations that Summit is a 
"privately-owned mutual water service corporation organized and registered under the laws of 
Utah as a non-profit corporation" Complaint, % 2, is a task for a trial court, not the Commission. 
See Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74 at % 13. Although there may be merit to Bear Hollow's claims, the 
Commission lacks jurisdiction to make a determination regarding such claims and must grant the 
Motion. 
Pursuant to Sections 63G-4-301 and 54-7-15 of the Utah Code, an aggrieved party 
may request agency review or rehearing of this Order by filing a written request with the 
Commission within 30 days after the issuance of this Order, Responses to a request for agency 
review or rehearing must be filed within 15 days of the filing of thfe request for review or 
rehearing. If the Commission does not grant a request for review or rehearing within 20 days 
after the filing of the request, it is deemed denied. Judicial review of the Commission's final 
agency action may be obtained by filing a petition for review with the Utah Supreme Court 
within 30 days after final agency action. Any petition for review must comply with the 
requirements of Sections 63G-4-40J and 63G-4-4D3 of the Utah Code and the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
"Mutual irrigation corporations are not organized to make a profit for their shareholders but rather to 
allocate water to shareholders who already own the right to use that water." Salt Lake City Corp. 879 P.2d at 
252. 
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DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah this 4th day of Febmary, 2010 
Ruben H. Arredondo 
Administrative Law Judge 
Approved and confirmed this 4th day of February, 2010 as the Order on Motions 
to Dismiss of the Public Service Commission of Utah. 
Ted Boyer, Chairman 
£ 
Ric CampBell, Commissioner 
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BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Formal Complaint and 
Request for Agency Action of Bear Hollow 
Restoration, LLC against Leon H. Saunders; 
Landmark Plaza Associates; Parley's Creek, 
Ltd.; Parley's Lane, Ltd.; Parley's Park; 
Stuart A. Knowles; Trilogy Limited, L.P.; 
Trilogy Asset Management, Inc.; Land and 
Water Resources, Inc.; Lawrence R. 
Knowles Irrevocable Trust: Leon H. 
Saunders, Stuart A. Knowles and Trilogy 
Limited, L.P. d/b/a SK Resources, a Utah 
General Partnership and/or Joint Venture, 
Summit Water Distribution Company, a 
Utah Corporation. 
DOCKET NO. 09-015-01 
ORDER DENYING REHEARING 
ISSUED: March 29, 2010 
By The Commission: 
This matter is before us on Bear Hollow Restoration, LLC's (Bear Hollow) 
Request for Rehearing of our February 4, 2010 order granting the Motions to Dismi^ and 
dismissing Bear Hollow's complaint. Bear Hollow also filed a First A.mended Complaint, which 
it sought to file and have us consider. 
We decline to grant a rehearing on the order granting the Motions to Dismiss. 
Additionally, we decline to consider the amended complaint. Bear Hollow cannot 
amend its complaint at this point. As cited by the individual shareholders in their opposing 
memorandum, "an order of dismissal is a final adjudication, and thereafter a plaintiff may not 
file an amended complaint." Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 231, 232 (Utah 1976). 
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We note that the Commission filed a Notice of Proposed Rule Repeal of Rule 
746-331 with the Utah Department of Administrative Services-Division of Administrative Rules 
on or about March 22, 2010. That proposed repeal is docketed online at www.psc.utah.gov 
under the "Miscellaneous Dockets", Docket No. 10-R331-01. 
Judicial review of the Commission's final agency action may be obtained by 
filing a petition for review with the Utah Supreme Court within 30 days after final agency action. 
Any petition for review must comply with the requirements of Sections 63G-4-401 and 63G-4-
403 of the Utah Code and the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
BEAR HOLLOW RESTORATION, LLC, 
Applicant/Complainant, 
LEON H. SAUNDERS; LANDMARK 
PLAZA ASSOCIATES; PARLEY'S 
CREEK, LTD.; PARLEY'S LANE, LTD.; 
PARLEY'S PARK; STUART A. 
KNOWLES; TRILOGY LIMITED, L.P.; 
TRILOGY ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC.; 
LAND & WATER RESOURCES, INC.; 
LAWRENCE R. KNOWLES 
IRREVOCABLE TRUST; LEON H. 
SAUNDERS, STUART A. KNOWLES and 
TRILOGY LIMITED, L.P. dba SK 
RESOURCES, a Utah general partnership 
and/or joint venture; SUMMIT WATER 








Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-7-9(l)(b) and 63G-4-201, and Utah Admin. Code 
R746-100-3.A and R746-331-1.A, Bear Hollow Restoration, LLC hereby complains and requests 
agency action against the Respondents as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Applicant/Complainant Bear Hollow Restoration, LLC ("Bear Hollow") is a 
Utah limited liability company and a "Class A" shareholder of Respondent Summit Water 
Distribution Company. 
2. Respondent Summit Water Distribution Company ("SWDC") is a privately-
owned mutual water service corporation organized and registered under the laws of Utah as a 
non-profit corporation. 
3. Respondent Leon H. Saunders is the founder of SWDC and, according to records 
available to Applicant/Complainant, its single largest Class A shareholder, its President, and a 
member of its board of directors. 
4. Upon information and belief, Respondent Landmark Plaza Associates is or was a 
Utah limited partnership owned and/or controlled by Respondent Leon H. Saunders and is a 
Class A shareholder of SWDC. 
5. Upon information and belief, Respondent Parley's Creek, Ltd. is a Utah limited 
partnership owned and/or controlled by Respondent Leon H. Saunders and is a Class A 
shareholder of SWDC. 
6. Upon information and belief, Respondent Parley's Lane, Ltd. is a Utah limited 
partnership owned and/or controlled by Respondent Leon H. Saunders and is a Class A 
shareholder of SWDC. 
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7. Upon information and belief, Respondent Parley's Park is a Utah limited 
partnership owned and/or controlled by Respondent Leon H. Saunders and is a Class A 
shareholder of SWDC. 
8. Respondents Landmark Plaza Associates, Parley's Creek, Ltd., Parley's Lane, 
Ltd., and Parley's Park are hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Saunders Entities." 
9. Respondent Stuart A. Knowles is a Class A shareholder and director of SWDC 
and, upon information and belief, is an officer of and/or owns a controlling interest in Trilogy 
Limited, L.P. 
10. Upon information and belief, Trilogy Limited, L.P. is a Georgia limited 
partnership owned and/or controlled by Respondent Stuart Ai Knowles and is a Class A 
shareholder of SWDC. 
11. Respondent Trilogy Asset Management, Inc. is a Qeorgia "for profit" corporation 
that, upon information and belief, is owned and/or controlled by Stuart A. Knowles, who serves 
as its CEO and CFO. Trilogy Asset Management, Inc. is the general partner of Trilogy Limited, 
L.P. 
12. Land & Water Resources, Inc. is a California corporation and a Class A 
shareholder of SWDC that is owned and/or controlled by Stuart A. Knowles. Land & Water 
Resources, Inc. was merged with Trilogy Limited, L.P. on or dboixt December 31, 2007. 
13. Respondent Lawrence R. Knowles Irrevocable Trust is a Class A shareholder of 
SWDC and, upon information and belief, is controlled or managed by Stuart A. Knowles. 
14. Respondents Trilogy Limited, L.P., Trilogy Asset Management, Inc., Land & 
Water Resources, Inc., and Lawrence R. Knowles Irrevocable Trust are hereinafter collectively 
referred to as the "Knowles Entities." 
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15. Respondent SK Resources is, upon information and belief, a Utah general 
partnership and/or joint venture between and among Leon H. Saunders, Stuart A. Knowles, 
and/or Trilogy Limited, L.P. 
16. Respondents each, independently and collectively, constitute a "public utility" 
and/or a "water corporation" as those terms are defined in Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(16)(a), (29). 
17. SWDC, Saunders, Knowles, the Saunders and Knowles Entities, and SK 
sources are, individually and collectively, a "person" as that term is defined in Utah Code 
Ann. § 54-2-2. 
JURISDICTION 
18. Jurisdiction over this action is properly held by the Public Service Commission 
("Commission") pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-1-2.5, 54-4-1, 54-7-9, and 63G-4-201, et 
seq. 
19. This action is brought pursuant to Utah Admin. Code R746-100-3.A. and R746-
331-l.A. 
L 
RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE REGULATED BY THE COMMISSION 
20. SWDC was incorporated on or about March 15, 1979, as a privately held mutual 
water company for the stated purpose of providing water service in unincorporated western 
Summit County, Utah. 
21. Since its inception, SWDC has provided or attempted to provide and fulfill the 
essential public use and purpose of providing water and water service for culinary, domestic, 
residential, commercial, and recreational uses in western Summit County, Utah. The culinary 
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water distribution system owned and operated by SWDC and controlled by the Respondents is a 
"water system" as defined in Utah Code section 54-2-l(30)(a). 
22. SWDC and Respondents are operating a "public utijlity" as defined in Utah Code 
section 54-2-1(16)(a) and are engaged in the development, establishment, operation, and 
maintenance of public water service facilities in western Summit County, Utah, including water 
rights, source, storage, treatment and distribution systems, facilities, and equipment. 
23. Utah Administrative Code R746-331-1 provides that a mutual water company 
may be exempt from Commission regulation if: 
the Commission finds that the entity is an existing non-profit corporation, in good 
standing with the Division of Corporations; that the entity owns or otherwise 
adequately controls the assets necessary to furnish culinary water service to its 
members, including water sources and plant; and that voting control of the entity 
is distributed in a way that each member enjoys a complete commonality of 
interest, as a consumer, such that rate regulation would be superfluous. 
Utah Admin. Code R746-331-1.C 
24. A finding by the Commission that a mutual witer company is exempt from 
Commission jurisdiction and regulation is not final and can be revoked: 
Issuance of the finding shall not preclude another Commission inquiry at a later 
time if changed circumstances or later-discovered facts warrant another inquiry. 
Id. 
A, 
Respondents Are Not Operating as a Non-Profit corporation 
25. SWDC is a non-profit organization in form only. In substance, SWDC and 
Respondents operate a vast, for-profit enterprise controlled and orchestrated by Saunders and 
Knowles and/or the Saunders Entities and Knowles Entities. 
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26. According to the October 25, 2002 SWDC shareholders list attached hereto as 
Exhibit A,1 Saunders and/or the Saunders Entities own 42.5% of all Class A shares of SWDC 
and 27.5% of all outstanding shares. Knowles and the Knowles Entities own 37.6% of all Class 
A shares and 24.4% of all outstanding shares. Together, Saunders and Knowles own and/or 
control 80.1% of all Class A shares and 51.9% of all outstanding shares. 
27. Saunders, Knowles, and/or Trilogy Limited, acting through SK Resources, have 
engaged in the pattern and practice of selling their Class A shares for profit. 
28. For example, on or about December 27, 1993, Saunders and Knowles entered into 
a Purchase Agreement to sell 289 Class A shares to Double M Investments, Ltd. for 
$1,300,500.00. (See Exhibit E attached hereto.) 
29. On or about October 11, 1995, SK Resources entered into a Share Purchase 
Agreement with Thomas Hulbert and/or Park City Hotel Partners, LLC for the sale of 13 Class A 
shares at a purchase price of $12,500.00 per share, for an aggregate purchase price of 
$162,500.00. (See Exhibit F attached hereto.) 
1
 It should be noted that, in an attempt to resolve its dispute with SWDC regarding SWDC's refusal to allow Bear 
Hollow to sell or transfer its shares of stock, Bear Hollow requested, pursuant to the Revised Nonprofit Corporation 
Act, the opportunity to inspect certain corporate records relating to SWDC's history and policy of transferring 
shares, including a list of all current shareholders. (See Letter from J. Craig Smith to Van J. Martin, dated June 15, 
2009, attached hereto as Exhibit B.) However, SWDC has refused to produce the requested records, claiming that 
Bear Hollow's records request is "inappropriate" because it does not relate to Bear Hollow's interest as a SWDC 
shareholder, which SWDC restricts to only ureceiv[ing] water delivery through its ownership of stock in the 
company." (See Letter from Lara Swensen to J. Craig Smith, attached hereto as Exhibit C.) 
Although Bear Hollow subsequently explained that its interest as a SWDC shareholder includes its right to 
"sell and/or lease its shares" and that its records request relates to such an interest, (see Letter from J. Craig Smith to 
Lara Swensen, dated August 6, 2009, attached hereto as Exhibit D), SWDC has refused to produce the requested 
records for inspection. Consequently, despite its status as a shareholder of SWDC, Bear Hollow has been unable to 
review or receive a copy of the current SWDC shareholder list. As such, Bear Hollow must refer to and attach to 
this Complaint the 2002 Shareholder List, which is the most recent list that Bear Hollow has been able to obtain. 
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30. On or about December 11, 1997, SK Resources entered into a Share Purchase 
Agreement with ASC Utah, Inc., dba The Canyons to sell 4 Class A shares at $4,800.00 per 
share. (See Exhibit G attached hereto.) 
31. On or about June 2, 1998, SK Resources enured into a Water Purchase 
Agreement with Bear Hollow Village, LLC to sell 260 Class A shares for $8,000.00 per share, 
for an aggregate purchase price of $2,080,000.00. (See Exhibit H attached hereto.) 
32. On or about June 21, 1999, SK Resources entered into a Share Purchase 
Agreement with Red Barn, LLC to sell 23 Class A shares for $15,000.00 per share, for an 
aggregate purchase price of $345,000.00. (See Exhibit I attached hereto.) 
33. On or about June 22, 1999, SK Resources entered into a Share Purchase 
Agreement with Fieldstone Partners, LLC to sell 30.5 Class A shares at $15,000.00 per share, for 
an aggregate purchase price of $457,500.00. (See Exhibit J attached hereto.) 
34. On or about July 19, 2000, SK Resources entered into a Water Purchase 
Agreement with Westgate Development, Ltd. to sell up to 100 Class A shares for $15,000.00 per 
share. (See Exhibit K attached hereto.) 
35. On or about August 10, 2000, SK Resources entered into a Water Purchase 
Agreement with Private Residence Club Associates, LLC to sell up to 63 Class A shares at 
15,000.00 per share, for a total purchase price of $945,000.00. (See Exhibit L attached hereto.) 
36. On or about August 15, 2000, SK Resources entered into a Water Purchase 
Agreement with Eagles Dance Development Co., LLC to sell 17 Class A shares at $15,000.00 
per share, for an aggregate purchase price of $255,000.00. (See Exhibit M attached hereto.) 
37. On or about August 30, 2001, SK Resources entered into a Water Purchase 
Agreement with Canyons Estates Homeowners Association, Inc. to sell 7.56 Class A shares at 
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$15,000.00 per share for an aggregate purchase price of $113,400.00. (See Exhibit N attached 
hereto.) 
38. On or about August 8, 2002, SK Resources entered into a Water Purchase 
Agreement with Park City Presbyterian Church to sell 4 Class A shares for $15,000.00 per share, 
for a total purchase price of $60,000.00. (See Exhibit O attached hereto.) 
39. Upon information and belief, from August 2002 through the present, Saunders, 
Knowles, Trilogy Limited, and/or SK Resources have entered into additional water purchase 
agreements with other consumers to sell Class A shares of SWDC for profit and continue to 
actively seek consumers to purchase SWDC Class A shares. 
40. For example, upon information and belief, Trilogy Asset Management, Inc., a "for 
profit" corporation (see Exhibit P attached hereto), owns the domain name 
"summitcountywater.com" and appears to be advertising water for sale over the internet (see 
Exhibit Q attached hereto). 
41. Upon information and belief, once Saunders and Knowles and/or the Saunders 
and Knowles Entities sell their Class A shares, they use their control over SWDC to issue new 
Class A shares to themselves so that Saunders and Knowles and/or the Saunders and Knowles 
Entities always maintain control of SWDC and can profit from the sale of Class A shares. 
42. For example, as of August 2, 2002, when the Division of Public Utilities ("DPU") 
issued its written memorandum to the Public Service Commission recommending that SWDC 
remain exempt from Commission regulation, the DPU reported that only approximately 5,000 
Class A shares had been issued. (See Exhibit R at 3, attached hereto.) 
43. However, as of October 25, 2002, less than three months after the DPU issued its 
written memorandum, Saunders owned or controlled 4,146.272 Class A shares and Knowles 
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owned or controlled 3,672.942 Class A shares, which represented more than 80% of all 
outstanding Class A shares and more than 50% of all outstanding shares, regardless of class. 
(Exhibit A.) 
44. Consequently, it appears that immediately after the DPU made its 
recommendation to the Commission that SWDC not be regulated, based, in part, on the 
assumptions that only 5,000 Class A shares had been issued ai^ d that it would take unlikely 
collusion between Class A shareholders to warrant regulation, SWDC immediately issued at 
least 2,819 more Class A shares to Saunders and Knowles and/or the Saunders and Knowles 
Entities so that Saunders and Knowles and/or the Saunders and Knowles Entities could, once 
again, manipulate and dominate SWDC. 
45. In addition to Respondents' operation as a "for profit" enterprise by, inter alia, 
manipulation of SWDC Class A shares so that Saunders and Knowles and/or the Saunders and 
Knowles Entities always maintain control of SWDC and can profit from the sale of Class A 
shares, SWDC also does not operate in a way that legitimately qualifies it for non-profit status 
under the Internal Revenue Code. 
46. While SWDC has maintained that it is entitled to tax-exempt status as a non-profit 
corporation under Section 501(c)(12) of the Internal Revenue Coc|e, it is actually not operating as 
a non-profit organization under federal rules and guidelines. 
47. For example, Part V-A of IRS Form 990 asks wnether "any officers, directors, 
trustees, or key employees listed in Form 990 receive compensation from any other 
organizations, whether tax exempt or taxable, that are related to the organization." 
48. Although Saunders and Knowles are directors of SWDC and have received 
millions of dollars from and through SK Resources, which is clfcarly related to SWDC, SWDC 
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has consistently and repeatedly failed to report the compensation paid to either Saunders or 
Knowles from the sale of their shares. 
49. Upon information and belief, SWDC and Respondents have consistently and 
repeatedly failed to do so because it would jeopardize SWDC's tax-exempt and non-profit status. 
B. 
The Respondents Do Not Own or Otherwise Adequately Control the Assets Necessary to 
Furnish Culinary Water Service to SWDC Shareholders 
50. Since the early 1980s, the Snyderville Basin, which is located in the western end 
of Summit County, experienced phenomenal growth both from resort developments and as a 
suburb of Salt Lake City. 
51. As the Snyderville Basin grew, water to sustain that growth became a very real 
concern and a very valuable commodity. 
52. Originally, there was no governmental entity outside the corporate limits of Park 
City to provide culinary water service, and growth was sustained through a number of small, 
private water companies. 
53. During the past 15 years, however, many of these small water companies have 
become part of Mountain Regional Water Special Service District ("Mountain Regional"), which 
was created by Summit County. 
54. Another large segment of the Snyderville Basin receives water from SWDC. 
55. Park City and Mountain Regional are governmental entities with powers of 
eminent domain and the ability to own water rights approved for municipal use, a use 
designation that allows all other beneficial uses. 
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56. In contrast, SWDC is a private water company that must specifically designate the 
uses to which it applies its water rights and is limited and bound by those specific designated 
uses. 
57. Exhibit S is a map of the distribution areas of the various water service providers 
for the SnyderviUe Basin. 
58. Bear Hollow has reviewed the following sources to determine the existing water 
holdings of SWDC and whether SWDC owns or otherwise adequately controls the water assets 
necessary to furnish culinary water service to its shareholders: (1) Division of Water Rights 
records for water rights owned by SWDC; (2) technical publications related to the water source 
capacity in the SnyderviUe Basin; (3) available corporate records for SWDC; (4) concurrency 
reports submitted to Summit County for water providers in the Basin; (5) litigation documents 
from cases related to water service in the SnyderviUe Basin; and (6) miscellaneous other 
documents related to water in the SnyderviUe Basin. 
59. Based upon Bear Hollow's extensive review and analysis, it appears that SWDC 
does not own or otherwise adequately control the water assets necessary to furnish culinary water 
service to all its shareholders. 
60. For example, although SWDC's Articles of Incorporation provide that shares 
shall be issued at the rate of one share per acre foot of water, SWDC has admitted to the DPU 
and elsewhere that a share of stock is worth delivery of only .76 acre feet of water. 
61. SWDC's water rights are of three basic kinds: (1) water rights based on contracts 
with the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District ("Weber Basin"); (2) water rights based on 
shares of Davis and Weber Counties Canal Company ("D&WCCC") stock; and (3) other water 
rights, including decreed rights and those approved by the Utah State Engineer. 
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62. The total number of acre-feet of water available to SWDC based on Weber Basin 
Contracts is 906 acre-feet. 
63. The total number of acre-feet of water available to SWDC based on its ownership 
of D&WCCC stock is approximately 4,829 acre feet. 
64. In addition to the water rights that SWDC holds under its shares in D&WCCC, it 
also has the right to receive an additional 5,000 acre feet of water from East Canyon Reservoir 
pursuant to a lease it has with D&WCCC, but this leased water is only accessible to SWDC users 
upon completion of a pipeline from East Canyon Reservoir to SWDC's water treatment plant 
near Jeremy Ranch. 
65. SWDC owns approximately 1,773.677 acre feet of decreed and State Engineer-
approved water rights which are approved for use in the Snyderville Basin. 
66. SWDC owns approximately 998 acre feet of other decreed and State Engineer-
approved waters which are not approved for use in the Snyderville Basin. 
67. Even when including the water rights that are not approved for diversion in the 
Snyderville Basin and the 5,000 acre feet of water that is non-usable until the East Canyon 
Pipeline is completed, the total acre feet of water legally available to SWDC is just 13,506.677 
acre feet. 
68. Consequently, even though more than 15,000 shares of SWDC stock have been 
issued at the rate of one share per acre foot of water, at best, SWDC only has the right to deliver 
a maximum of 13,506.677 acre feet of water, leaving a minimum of approximately 1,500 shares 
at risk of having no right to receive water. 
69. If the 998 acre feet of water that is not approved for use in the Snyderville Basin 
and the unusable East Canyon Pipeline-dependent 5,000 acre feet are excluded from the 
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calculation of presently available water, SWDC only has 7,508.677 acre feet of water that is 
currently usable.2 
70. Additionally, 2,190 acre feet of D&WCCC water can only be taken when the flow 
in East Canyon Creek is more than 6 cubic feet per second, which typically only occurs during 
the spring runoff. This further reduces the available water to as little as 5,318.677 acre feet, 
which would support just more than 1/3 of the 15,000+ shares issued to SWDC shareholders. 
71. In short, a minimum of approximately 1,500 to 10,000 SWDC shares are at risk of 
having no right to receive water at any given time. 
72. A summary containing tables of SWDC's water rights is attached hereto as 
Exhibit T. 
73. SWDC simply does not own or otherwise adequately control the water assets 
necessary to furnish culinary water service to its members, including water sources and plant, 
and, therefore, should not be exempt from PSC regulation. 
C. 
There is Not Complete Commonality of Interest Among Shareholders 
74. SWDC's voting control is not distributed in a way that each shareholder of 
SWDC enjoys a complete commonality of interest, as a consumer, such that rate regulation 
would be superfluous. 
75. SWDC's Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation, attached hereto as 
Exhibit U, authorize the issuance of up to 35,000 shares of stock, divided into four classes: up to 
15,000 shares of Class A (development) stock; up to 15,000 shares of Class B (water use) stock; 
2
 Consequently, of the 15,000+ shares issued, approximately 8,000 are not backed by water and are unusable. This 
just happens to coincide with the number of Class A shares held by Saunders and Knowles, suggesting that SWDC 
is being used as a mechanism to allow Saunders and Knowles to speculate in water. 
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up to 4,000 shares of Class C (irrigation) stock; and up to 1,000 shares of Class D (snowmaking) 
stock. 
76. Class A (development) shares are issued to developers upon conveyance to 
SWDC of sufficient water rights and source site. Upon the sale of a lot from a developer to a 
customer, a Class A (development) share is convertible to a Class B (use) share appurtenant to 
and inseparable from the lot. 
77. Class A (development) shares represent a proportionate but specific interest in the 
corporation's domestic and culinary water, including the contributed source site, source, and 
source capacity, but no interest whatsoever in the corporation's water distribution works, e.g., 
water diversion facilities, pipelines, water storage facilities, appurtenant works, etc., and do not 
entitle the holder thereof to water delivery. 
78. Because Class A (development) shares do not entitle the holder thereof to water 
delivery, Class A (development) shareholders, by and large, are not and cannot be consumers— 
at least until their Class A shares are converted to Class B shares. 
79. In this manner, non-consumers may be, and are, members of SWDC. 
80. Like Class A (development) shares, Class B (use) shares represent an actual 
proportionate ownership interest in the water rights of the corporation, but, unlike Class A 
(development) shares (that have no interest whatsoever in diversion, distribution, and storage 
facilities), Class B (use) shares also represent a corresponding interest in the diverting facilities, 
distribution works, and water storage facilities and entitle the Class B (use) shareholder to 
delivery of culinary water. 
81. In spite of their differing interests in delivery of water and SWDC system 
facilities, Class A (development) and Class B (use) shares have equal voting rights with each 
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share being entitled to one vote, while Class C (irrigation) and Class D (snowmaking) shares 
have no voting rights. 
82. Class A shares are generally non-assessable, except! (1) as needed to maintain the 
developer's specifically contributed water rights in good standing, and (2) special assessments or 
contract charges associated with the developer's contributed water rights. 
83. In contrast, Class B (use), Class C (irrigation), and Class D (snowmaking) shares 
each are fully assessable for the provision of water service and maintenance and operation of the 
water treatment, storage, and distribution systems and facilities. 
84. Assessments for water use, as well as all assessments for other purposes, are 
levied by the Board of Directors, who are elected by all voting shareholders, which are Class A 
(development) shareholders and Class B (use) shareholders. 
85. As of May, 2001, SWDC had issued 10,235 Class ^ (development) shares (84%) 
and only 1,878 Class B (use) shares (16%). 
86. As of October 25, 2002, SWDC had issued 15,066.39 total shares, with 9,758.13 
shares comprising Class A (development) shares (64%), and the remaining 5,308.76 shares 
comprising Class B (use), Class C (irrigation), and Class D (snowmaking) shares (36%). 
87. At that time, Saunders and/or the Saunders Entities owned 4,146.272 Class A 
(development) shares, and Knowles and/or the Knowles Entities owned 3,672.942 Class A 
(development) shares. Together, Mr. Saunders and Mr. Knowles, and their related entities, 
collectively owned approximately 80% of the Class A (development) shares and 52% of 
SWDC's total issued and outstanding shares. 
88. Consequently, it would require the agreement of only Saunders and Knowles to 
outvote the interests of the Class B shareholders. 
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89. Knowles is the Secretary, CEO, and CFO of Trilogy Asset Management, Inc., the 
General Partner of Trilogy Limited, L.P. 
90. Saunders and Knowles (through Trilogy Limited, L.P.), are collectively doing 
business and holding themselves out as "S-K Water Resources" or "SK Resources," which is 
known to be selling S WDC Class A (development) shares for substantial sums. 
91. SK Resources is not, and has not been at any time, registered with the Utah 
Department of Commerce, Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, and it is not a non-
profit organization. Neither are Saunders, Knowles, and the Saunders and Knowles Entities. 
92. Saunders and Knowles, Class A (development) shareholders who collectively 
held over 52% of all issued stock in 2002 but are now engaged in selling such shares at a 
substantial premium, do not enjoy a complete commonality of interest with all Class B (use) 
shareholders. 
93. Because of their minority shareholder status, Class B (use) shareholders, which 
are SWDC's rate-paying consumer-members, do not have it in their power to elect other 
directors, which are elected by a simple majority vote, and demand necessary changes or control 
the rate-making process. 
94. In 2001, SWDC's officers and directors comprised the following: 
President Leon H. Saunders 
Vice President Roger J. Sanders 
Secretary/Treasurer Van Martin 
Director Jerry W. Dearinger 
Director Lawrence Knowles 
Director Lynn Nelson 
95. In 2004, 2005, and 2006, SWDC's officers and directors comprised the following: 
President Leon H. Saunders 
Vice President Jerry W. Dearinger 
Secretary/Treasurer Van Martin 
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Director Jerry W. Dearinger 
Director Leon H. Saunders 
Director Stuart Knowles 
Director Lynn Nelson 
Director Tim Vetter 
Director Roger J. Sanders 
96. As of May, 2009, SWDC's Board of Directors comprises the following: 
Director Leon H. Saunders 
Director Van J. Martin 
Director Jerry W. Dearinger 
Director Stuart A. Knowles 
Director Lynn Nelson 
Director Robert Valentine 
Director Tim Vetter 
97. From 2001 to 2009, the makeup of SWDC's officers and directors has changed 
very little, with its officers and directors, as Class A (development) shareholders, generally 
controlling a majority of all SWDC shares. 
98. From 2001 to 2009, only one of the officers and directors (Leon Saunders, 
President) was a Class B (use) shareholder (of only 1.5 shares) according to the 2002 share 
distribution, but he also owned and was a principal of entities that owned collectively over 4,000 
Class A (development) shares. Of the other directors and officers, Lynn Nelson also owned 55.5 
Class A (development) shares, and Stuart A. Knowles, either individually or through entities that 
he owned or controlled, including Trilogy Limited, L.P., owned of controlled over 3,600 Class A 
(development) shares. 
99. It cannot be said of SWDC that "the owner is both the seller and buyer" because 
Class A (development) shareholders, although owners, do not ai^ d cannot buy or receive water 
service. 
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100. Class A (development) shares, although having equal voting rights with Class B 
(use) shares, have no responsibility to bear the costs of operation of SWDC's water treatment, 
storage, and distribution systems and facilities. 
101. Additionally, non-voting shareholders holding assessable Class C (irrigation) 
shares do not enjoy a commonality of interest with voting shareholders holding non-assessable 
Class A shares or with shareholders holding assessable Class B shares because they do not have 
any voting rights. 
102. Non-voting shareholders holding assessable Class D (snowmaking) shares do not 
enjoy a commonality of interest with voting shareholders holding non-assessable Class A shares 
or with shareholders holding assessable Class B shares because they do not have any voting 
rights. 
103. Shareholders holding Class C (irrigation) shares, as non-voting shares, have 
absolutely no control over the rate-setting process for the rates and assessments they must pay. 
104. Shareholders holding Class D (snowmaking) shares, as non-voting shares, have 
absolutely no control over the rate-setting process for the rates and assessments they must pay. 
105. The conflict of interest between owner-vendor and consumer-vendee inherent in 
public utility companies is not lacking in SWDC, nor are the consumer and producer interests 
one and the same. 
106. Class A (development) shareholders, whose shares are non-assessable and are not 
entitled to the delivery or use of any water, do not have the same interest as the other Class B 
(use), Class C (irrigation), or Class D (snowmaking) shareholders in maintaining just and 
reasonable rates and assessments for the delivery and use of water. 
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107. The voting control of Saunders and Knowles and/or the Saunders and Knowles 
Entities is such that there is not complete commonality of interest between and among even the 
Class A shareholders. Therefore, SWDC is not and cannot be a se^f-regulating enterprise. 
WHEREFORE, Bear Hollow respectfully requests the agency action set forth hereinafter 
in its Request(s) for Agency Action. 
II. 
RESPONDENTS' PRACTICES VIOLATE UTAH CODE ANN, § 54-3-8 
108. Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-8(1) provides that a public utility may not, "as to rates, 
charges, service, facilities or in any other respect, make or grant #iy preference or advantage to 
any person, or subject any person to any prejudice or disadvantage; and ... establish or maintain 
any unreasonable difference as to rates, charges, service or facilities, or in any other respect, 
either as between localities or as between classes of service." 
109. On June 2, 1998, Bear Hollow Village, LLC ("BHV") purchased 260 Class A 
(development) shares from Trilogy Limited, L.P. and Leon H. Saunders, collectively doing 
business as "S-K Water Resources," in anticipation of developing approximately 175 acres in 
Summit County, Utah (the "Development")-
110. BHV paid S-K Water Resources $8,000 per share ffcr an aggregate purchase price 
of $2,080,000. 
111. Saunders and Knowles, the Saunders and Knowles untitles, and/or SK Resources 
used their ownership and control over SWDC to require BHV to sign a Development Agreement 
with SWDC by which the 260 Class A (development) shares purchased by BHV were required 
to be appurtenant to the Development and inseparable from the Development property without 
the written consent of SWDC, even though the shares owned and/or controlled by SK Resources 
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and/or its constituent members were not, themselves, subject to any type of appurtenancy 
limitation or restriction. 
112. Complainant Bear Hollow is the successor-in-interest to BHV. 
113. As the Development neared completion, Bear Hollow discovered that it had more 
shares than it needed to service the Development. 
114. In March 2009, Bear Hollow entered into a Water Share Purchase and Option 
Agreement with a third party buyer ("Buyer") by which the Buyer purchased one (1) share of 
Bear Hollow's 21.59 excess Class A (development) shares. The Buyer and Bear Hollow agreed 
to work with SWDC to remove any place of use restrictions associated with the 21.59 Class A 
(development) shares, including the share purchased by the Buyer, and if the Buyer and Bear 
Hollow succeeded in resolving the place of use issue, the Buyer would purchase the remaining 
20.59 shares from Bear Hollow. 
115. Bear Hollow contacted SWDC and requested that SWDC transfer the one Class A 
(development) share purchased by the Buyer, but SWDC informed Bear Hollow that SWDC 
would not transfer the share to the Buyer. 
116. Bear Hollow then met with the SWDC Board of Directors at S WDC's May 2009 
meeting and petitioned the Board to transfer to the Buyer the one Class A (development) share 
purchased by the Buyer. 
117. The Board denied the request and asserted that it would not authorize or endorse 
the transfer of the share to the Buyer. 
118. Saunders and Knowles, the Saunders and Knowles Entities, and/or SK Resources' 
manipulation of SWDC's rules, regulations, and practices prohibiting or refusing the transfer of 
the Class A (development) share to the Buyer is discriminatory against Bear Hollow and the 
4836-5390-5155/HA566-013 2 0 
Buyer; subjects Bear Hollow and the Buyer to prejudice or disadvantage; and establishes 
unreasonable differences as to service or facilities, or in any other respect, as between localities 
or as between classes of service, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § £4-3-8. 
119. Saunders and Knowles, the Saunders and Knowles Entities, and/or SK Resources' 
manipulation of SWDC's rules, regulations, and practices prohibiting or refusing the transfer of 
the Class A (development) share to the Buyer arbitrarily and unreasonably results in the creation 
of at least two classes of Class A shares—extremely valuable and fungible shares owned by 
Saunders and Knowles and/or the Saunders and Knowles Entities, which are readily marketable 
and not tethered to any particular piece of land within the Snyderville Basin, and worthless and 
unusable shares owned by parties such as Bear Hollow, which cannot be sold because they are 
tethered to a particular piece of land that does not need them. 
120. SWDC's rules, regulations, and practices prohibiting or refusing the transfer of 
the Class A (development) share to the Buyer where such share represents excess and 
unnecessary water for land to which it is deemed appurtenant violates this State's policy to 
encourage the beneficial use of water and arbitrarily and unreasonably contradicts the intent of 
SWDC's Articles of Incorporation, art. Ill, by not "promoting] the general interest and welfare 
of the shareholders" and not making such water available for tne "use and benefit of the 
shareholders of the corporation." 
121. Respondents' discriminatory conduct in refusing to| allow Bear Hollow to alienate 
its shares violates SWDC's Articles of Incorporation, which do not expressly allow Class A 
(development) shares to be appurtenant to and inseparable from a particular property or area {see 
Ex. U, art. XIII). 
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122. Even though Section 54-3-8 prohibits a public utility from "mak[ing] or 
grantfing] any preference or advantage to any person, or subjecting] any person to any prejudice 
or disadvantage," Saunders and Knowles and/or the Saunders and Knowles entities, acting 
through SK Resources and through their manipulation and control of SWDC, have created an 
enterprise whereby they have not only profited tremendously by the commoditization of their 
Class A shares but have also done so by prejudicing or disadvantaging the shares and rights of 
others, such as Bear Hollow, so as to stifle the ability of Bear Hollow and others to compete with 
them in providing Class A shares to the consuming public. 
WHEREFORE, Bear Hollow respectfully requests the agency action set forth hereinafter 
in its Request(s) for Agency Action. 
III. 
RESPONDENTS'PRACTICES VIOLATE UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-3-1 
123. Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1 provides that "[a]U charges made, demanded or 
received by any public utility, or by any two or more public utilities, for any product or 
commodity furnished or to be furnished, or for any service rendered or to be rendered, shall be 
just and reasonable." 
124. Saunders and Knowles, the Saunders and Knowles Entities, and/or SK Resources, 
with the help of SWDC, are marketing a valuable public resource—water—by selling Class A 
shares at whatever prices they dictate. 
125. The charges for Class A shares are arbitrary and unreasonable due to the fact that 
Saunders and Knowles, the Saunders and Knowles Entities, and/or SK Resources, with the help 
of SWDC, are maintaining a monopoly or near-monopoly on the purchase of Class A shares and 
the conversion of Class A shares to Class B shares. 
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WHEREFORE, Bear Hollow respectfully requests the agency action set forth hereinafter 
in its Request(s) for Agency Action. 
REQUEST FOR AGENCY ACTION - SWDC 
126. Bear Hollow incorporates the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth 
herein. 
127. Based upon the foregoing, Bear Hollow respectfully requests that the Commission 
commence a Commission inquiry as to whether SWDC qualifies for exemption from 
Commission regulation pursuant to Utah Administrative Rule R746-331-L 
128. Bear Hollow requests that SWDC's exemption be revoked for one or more of the 
following reasons: 
(1) SWDC is not operating as non-profit corporation, in good standing with the 
Division of Corporations; 
(2) SWDC does not own or otherwise adequately control the assets necessary to 
furnish culinary water service to its members, including water sources and plant; or 
(3) SWDC's voting control is not distributed in a way that each member enjoys a 
complete commonality of interest, as a consumer, such that rate regulation would be superfluous. 
129. Bear Hollow requests a%*>rder from the Commission that, prior to charging rates 
and collecting fees for utility service, SWDC must first file with the Commission a tariff and 
schedules showing all rates, tolls, rentals, charges, assessments, and classifications to be 
enforced or collected. 
130. Bear Hollow requests an order from the Commission that SWDC be required to 
file with the Commission service area maps with clearly defined boundaries of SWDC's service 
area for the benefit of SWDC, its customers, and other water utilities. 
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13 L Bear Hollow requests that the Commission determine, ascertain, and fix just and 
reasonable rules, regulations, and practices to be imposed on and observed by SWDC for the 
transfer of Class A (development) shares, including just and reasonable rates for the transfer of 
Class A shares. 
132. Bear Hollow further requests that the Commission initiate all other necessary and 
proper proceedings to assert Commission jurisdiction and regulation over SWDC, as the 
Commission, in its discretion, deems necessary. 
REQUEST FOR AGENCY ACTION - ALL OTHER RESPONDENTS 
133. Bear Hollow incorporates the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth 
herein. 
134. Based upon the foregoing, Bear Hollow respectfully requests that the Commission 
commence a Commission inquiry as to whether all the other Respondents, including, but not 
limited to, Saunders, Knowles, the Saunders and Knowles Entities, and SK Resources should be 
regulated as a public utility or qualify for exemption from Commission regulation pursuant to 
Utah Administrative Rule R746-33M. 
135. Bear Hollow requests an order from the Commission finding that the other 
Respondents, particularly SK Resources, are public utilities subject to Commission regulation 
because Respondents—particularly Saunders, Knowles, and SK Resources—are providing 
culinary water to consumers but none of the Respondents is operating as a non-profit 
corporation, in good standing with the Division of Corporations. 
136. Bear Hollow requests an order from the Commission that, prior to charging rates 
and collecting fees for providing Class A shares and wholesale water to consumers, Respondents 
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must first file with the Commission a tariff and schedules showing all rates, tolls, rentals, 
charges, assessments, and classifications to be enforced or collected. 
137. Bear Hollow requests an order from the Commission that Respondents be 
required to file with the Commission service area maps with clearly defined boundaries of their 
service area for the benefit of their customers and other water utilities. 
138. Bear Hollow requests that the Commission investigate the rules, regulations, and 
practices of Respondents pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-4, 54-4-7, and 54-4-18, and 
determine, ascertain, and fix just and reasonable rules, regulations, and practices to be imposed 
on and observed by them. 
139. Bear Hollow requests that the Commission determine, ascertain, and fix just and 
reasonable rules, regulations, and practices to be imposed on and observed by the other 
Respondents for the transfer of Class A (development) shares, including just and reasonable rates 
for the transfer of Class A shares. 
140. Bear Hollow further requests that the Commission initiate all other necessary and 
proper proceedings to assert Commission jurisdiction and regulation over the other Respondents, 
as the Commission, in its discretion, deems necessary. 
Respectfully submitted this f P day of September, 2009. 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
^TCraig 9 ^ y ^ 3 
( Daniel L^ftoDonald^ 
Sattffyn J. Steffey 
Attorneys for Applicant/Complainant 
Bear Hollow Restoration, LLC 
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Address of Applicant/Complainant: 
308 East 4500 South, Suite 200 
Murray, Utah 84107 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the lO """day of September, 2009, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR AGENCY ACTION to be mailed 
via U.S. mail and Certified Mail to the following: 
Van J. Martin, Registered Agent 
Summit Water Distribution Company 
6400 N Pace Frontage Road #A 
Park City, UT 84098 
Leon H. Saunders 
1899 Longview Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Landmark Plaza Associates 
c/o Michael J. Milner, Registered Agent 
1557 E. Waterbury Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Landmark Plaza Associates 
c/o Leon H. Hy Saunders, Partner 
1899 Longview Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Parley's Creek, Ltd. 
c/o Lora Romney, Registered Agent 
52 East 700 South 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
Parley's Creek, Ltd. 
c/o Leon H. Saunders, Partner 
2505 W. White Pine Lane 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Parley's Lane, Ltd. 
c/o Lora Romney, Registered Agent 
52 East 700 South 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
Parley's Lane, Ltd. 
c/o Leon H. Saunders, Partner 
2505 W.White Pine Lane 
Park City, Utah 84060 
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Parley's Park 
c/o Leon H. Saunders, Partner 
2505 W. White Pine Lane 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Stuart A. Knowles 
550 Hartz Avenue, Suite 200 
Danville, CA 94526 
Trilogy Limited, L.P. 
c/o Stuart A. Knowles, California Registered Agent 
550 Hartz Avenue, Suite 200 
Danville, CA 94526 
Trilogy Limited, L.P. 
c/o William B. Shearer, Jr., P.C, Georgia Registered Agent 
1201 West Peachtree Street NW 14th Floor 
Atlanta, GA 30309 
Land & Water Resources, Inc. 
c/o Trilogy Limited, L.P., its successor by merger 
Attn: Stuart A. Knowles, California Registered Agent 
550 Hartz Avenue, Suite 200 
Danville, CA 94526 
Land & Water Resources, Inc. 
c/o Trilogy Limited, L.P., its successor by merger 
Attn: William B. Shearer, Jr., P.C, Georgia Registered Agent 
1201 West Peachtree Street NW 14th Floor 
Atlanta, GA 30309 
Trilogy Asset Management, Inc. 
c/o William B. Shearer, Jr., P.C, Registered Agent 
1201 West Peachtree Street NW 14th Floor 
Atlanta, GA 30309 
Trilogy Asset Managemetn, Inc. 
c/o Stuart A. Knowles, CEO 
550 Hartz Avenue, Suite 200 
Danville, CA 94526 
Lawrence R. Knowles Irrevocable Trust 
c/o Stuart A. Knowles, CEO 
550 Hartz Avenue, Suite 200 
Danville, CA 94526 
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SK Resources 
44 West Broadway, Suite 2003S 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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